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Chapter 1
Introduction
The following work focuses on international treaties as a way to reach a sustainable level
of anthropogenic pollution. The need for a commonly shared, global answer in the ﬁght
against climate change comes from the fact that concentration levels of greenhouse gases in
the Earth atmosphere have constantly grown in the last centuries. Starting from the original
levels measured just before the Industrial Revolution, the volumes of CO2
1 have steadily
increased from year to year, reaching their absolute peak in 2014 and experiencing only in
2015 -for the very ﬁrst time after more than one and a half century- a slight reduction.
It has been widely accepted and recognised by the vast majority of the scientiﬁc commu-
nity how these gases are the main responsible for climate change, to which is associated a
global warming process. If the Earth surface's temperatures will increase beyond a certain
cap in the very next years, this would have dramatic consequences for the planet, and would
force the human race to modify in a drastic way our lifestyle and probably even the geogra-
phy of our settlements. Luckily the concerns of the scientiﬁc community are more and more
being listened and shared by global governments. Even those which in the recent past were
more refractory to take into account environmental themes are now changing their behaviors
towards climate.
In this precise context numerous international treaties have been drawn up, with a con-
stantly growing number of ratiﬁers. Countless conferences have been and are being held,
with the aim of studying and ﬁnding a solution for an issue that is constantly getting worse,
with the point of no return for the climate's safety is estimated as belonging to the current
century.
1The main gas among the greenhouse ones, representing the unity of measure on whose basis the others
are converted and evaluated.
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The ﬁrst part of this work deals with international environmental treaties from an eco-
nomic and institutional point of view. In the second part, mathematical models resulting
from game theory are formulated in order to depict how treaties work.
1.1 Classical tools for pollution reduction
Economic theories on environmental contamination are the subject of the second chapter, in
which we do not directly address the greenhouse gases issue, but the ones of environmental
protection instead. We adopt the classical theories of environmental economics, according to
which the focus must be set on the environment as a scarce good to be safeguarded. Pollution
is therefore deﬁned as a by-product of industrial production (a negative externality), and the
aim of the economic literature is to reduce it within acceptable limits.
We see diﬀerent methods in order to determine the socially optimal emission level, where
societies are meant to be constituted by both producers and consumers, as well as citizens
who are negatively aﬀected by the contamination probem. From the very beginning we ob-
serve that markets alone are not able to guarantee that such a level is going to be reached,
and because of this the presence of a sub-partes regulator is required. In practice, it may be
identiﬁed with a national authority exerting a certain degree of powers over its own jurisdic-
tion, or with -and this is our case- a sovranational treaty which can rule the environmental
actions of more than one country.
We examine three types of economic incentives that can help reducing (greenhouse gases)
emission levels: price rationing measures, including emission taxes, taxes on products and
subsidies, whose aim is to modify the producer's behavior by changing his very own cost
function; responsibilities rules, and we particularly focus on the sanctions associated with
the deviation from the rules; quantity rationing methods, which involve the creation of a
market -under the watchful eye of the regulator- for the trade of emission allowances that at
the beginning are allocated among all market participants. We also mention an hybrid form,
resulting from a combination between the ﬁrst and third types, in which emission taxes and
tradable allowances are gathered in order to create a stronger, more ﬂexible method.
The last two sections of the chapter are dedicated to the practical application of economic
incentives. We start by enumerating the practical conditions for their successful establish-
ment, and then we proceed by listing the four criteria required to evaluate their performance:
eﬀectiveness, eﬃciency, equity and ﬂexibility.
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1.2 GHG as a transboundary pollution problem
In the third chapter the focus shifts from economic theories to reality. Greenhouse gases
are deﬁned as the main and worst example of transboundary pollution, a type of contami-
nation which aﬀects the world as a whole, independently from the place in which they were
originated. This is the reason why the drafting of international environmental treaties is so
fundamental, as long as the largest possible number of countries is involved. CO2 emissions
are not an exclusive problem regarding just a number of nations or speciﬁc locations, even
if it is certain that some states suﬀer or are going to experience graver consequences than
others. Having stated that, no country will be completely unharmed by the damages caused
by global warming, and therefore it is both obvious and fair that they must all give their
contribution in order to reach a common solution.
After having explained what greenhouse gases are and how determinant their role in
contributing to climate change is, we analyse what is the ultimate objective set by the ex-
perts. As a matter of fact the scientiﬁc community has alreay stated that a certain degree
of global warming, intended as some temperature increase with respect to the pre-industrial
levels, cannot be avoided anymore. In order to prevent worse damages, a particular thresh-
old was determined, to which important climatic consequences -but neither catastrophic nor
irreversible- are associated. We examine how and why such a peculiar value was chosen, as
long as some critics on its eﬀectiveness.
Finally, we contextualise this matter by providing an (almost) present-day example.
China, currently the world's greatest polluter, has reached the highest pollution levels ever
recorded in its already suﬀering capital in the very same days in which the 21st session of the
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) was being held.
Even if this fact probably did not contributed to increase its commitment during the
negotiations -since the delegations' works had started a few months earlier- it certainly rep-
resented a curious coincidence. During those days the Chinese nation, as well as the world as
a whole, was watching its representatives and asking the conference to draw up a document
that could really be able to change things.
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1.3 Global results against climate change
After having analysed the economic tools and having explained why a greenhouse gases
emission reduction is needed, the following chapter deals in a closer way with international
environmental treaties.
Anthropogenic contamination is as old as humanity itself. It is believed that the very ﬁrst
forms of pollution appeared together with our civilisation, in the prehistoric caves (Spengler
et al. 1983). About 5000 years ago, when more developed populations grew around big urban
settlements, pollution became more important as well, and started to negatively aﬀect nations
and geographical regions. However, it took more than 6700 years for it to become a global
issue. When coal began to be used on a large scale and when the Industrial Revolution
took place, greenhouse gases emissions became the concerning problem we are still facing
nowadays.
Despite the longevity of this matter, in order to make our work as current as possible we
have chosen to focus on a very small period: the 24 years elapsed between 1992 and 2015.
We analyse the path that have brought to the 2015 Paris agreement, mentioning both the
milestones that have been reached and the failures that have been made.
In the ﬁrst part of the chapter, our focus is particularly placed on four years: 1992, 1997,
2010 and 2012. In other words, the years in which the UNFCCC, the Kyoto protocol, the
Cancun agreement and the Doha amendment were constituted. For each one of these funda-
mental treaties we underline the elements of innovation, what they have tried to accomplish
and in what they have succeeded, and -where possible- the elements of connection with the
Paris agreement.
In the end, our focus shifts right towards it, the most recent international environmental
treaty, after a brief evalutation of the eﬀectiveness of the 1992-2014 international policies
against climate change.
As a matter of fact, this work had the luck of being written during an historical moment
for the ﬁght against global warming: from November 30 to the very ﬁrst days of December,
the 2015 COP21 was held in Paris, France. Its aim was to ﬁnd a legally-binding and, for the
very ﬁrst time in history, universal agreement on climate.
At the beginning of the month, the negotiators of each state delegation reunited in Paris
and after many sleepless night on December 12 a ﬁnal draft was presented. On the very
morning of that day UN Secretary General Ki-Moon announced to the world that:
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we have entered a new era of global cooperation on one of the most complex
issues ever to confront humanity. For the ﬁrst time, every country in the world
has pledged to curb emissions, strengthen resilience and join in common cause to
take common climate action2.
The text was deﬁned as an ambitious and fair one, and will become legally-binding for its
ratiﬁers in the next few years. Even K. Naidoo, executive director of Greenpeace Interna-
tional, the non-governmental environmental organisation that in the past has hardly criticised
treaties like the Kyoto protocol, stated that:
This deal puts the fossil fuel industry on the wrong side of history [...]. This
deal alone won't dig us out the hole we're in, but it makes the sides less steep.
To pull us free of fossil fuels we are going to need to mobilise in ever greater
numbers (Yardley 2015).
In the last section of the fourth chapter we see how this treaties diﬀerentiates from the ones
that have been written before it, how it works and what it hopes to accomplish.
The chapter does also constitute the end of Part I.
1.4 Fundamentals of game theory
Modern game theory was born in the last century, when J. von Neumann published his
book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944: through all these years, this ﬁeld
of study has repeatedly proven to be a valid method in addressing and resolving important
matters. Since its birth, it has earned a valid reputation worldwide3, and is now one of the
most powerful tools at our disposal to face some of the most important problems of our times.
An extensive scientiﬁc literature has used the methodologies provided by game theory for
the quest of solutions to the most diﬀerent environmental issues. During the last century,
the more public concerns about global warming as a result of the increasing greenhouse gases
emissions grew, the more mathematicians and applied economists dedicated their attention
to such matters. Works on the preservation of environmental quality multiplied, reaching
their peak in the second half of the nineties, after the drafting of the Kyoto protocol.
2Source: <http://www.newsroom.unfccc.int>.
3In the last 70 years, eleven economic Nobel prizes were won by game theorist, the latest being Jean Tirole
in 2014.
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This is precisely the set to which the second part of our work belongs; it is composed by
two chapters.
The ﬁrst one has the objective of providing in a brief way the necessary basis in order
to face, comprehend and solve optimal control problems. To do so, we start from the very
fundamentals of game theory, by deﬁning what it is, which its main assumptions are and so
on, until the formulation of a Nash equilibrium. The ﬁrst part of the chapter ends with the
mention of some of the main critics about game theory, as well as the answers given by its
supporters.
From this point the work becomes a little more complex, since we introduce the concept
of dynamic games. As a matter of fact these are more realistic but also less simple than the
static ones, because they take into account not only the time element, but also the possibility
for a player to react in a strategic way with respect to his own previous actions, by utilising
some informations that were not previously at his disposal.
We then take into account a particular kind of dynamic games, the diﬀerential ones.
After having described their functioning and features, we consider two related concepts, the
open-loop and Markovian strategies.
The fourth and last part of the chapter is entirely dedicated to optimal control problems,
and to their resolution. To this end, we introduce two diﬀerent methodologies, the Hamil-
ton - Jacobi - Bellman equation and the Pontryagin Maximum Principle, which purpose
some suﬃcient and necessary conditions in order to ﬁnd potentially optimal solutions for the
problem.
1.5 A model for environmental treaties
The last part of our work is dedicated to the explanation -under the form of an optimal con-
trol problem- of how international environmental treaties operate. The methods depicted in
the previous chapter are used in order to analyse a model built starting from the one created
by Kaitala and Pohjola (1995). We ﬁrst approach their diﬀerential game with an inﬁ-
nite horizon, and then consider a situation characterised by ﬁnite time, in which two blocks
of nations (representing wealthier and still-developing economies) are facing environmental
issues caused by greenhouse gases pollution.
In the beginning we deal with the non-cooperative scenario and ﬁnd the related solution.
We then analyse what happens when the two players reach an agreement, and how their
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roles in the process of global warming reduction may be evaluated and more or less rewared
by the regulator. This is exactly what takes place with environmental treaties, since they
always tend to recognise a more active role to developed countries in the ﬁght against climate
change, while developing ones' eﬀorts are often not required, or just encouraged.
We see that this consideration expressed by the regulator may be represented through the
use of a coeﬃcient, α, to which is associated a certain level of discount on the environmental
damages produced by both blocks. The more the polluting emissions of the ﬁrst one are fully
considered, the less penalised is the second one, which is able to reach higher contamination
levels, that of course are linked with an higher production and therefore with higher proﬁts.
Finally, we observe that since in the real world a truly independent and sovranational regu-
lator does not exist, environmental treaties may be seen as the consequence of a process of
negotiation performed by the two parties we have previously taken into account.
Starting from this consideration, we consider general solutions to the cases in which
parties dispose of diﬀerent bargaining powers. In order to do such thing, we use the concept
of eﬃcient frontier and some diﬀerent solving methodologies that have been developed after
Nash's work (1950).

Part I
Economic and institutional approaches
14

Chapter 2
Classical tools for pollution reduction
The First Fundamental Welfare Theorem, demonstrated by Debreu and Arrow (1951-
1954) states that under certain, ideal conditions, market equilibria are Pareto eﬃcient,
meaning that they achieve a state from which it is impossible to make one individual better
oﬀ without making another one worse oﬀ.
Environmental quality may be considered as a scarce resource, since its use or protection
involve a certain degree of opportunity costs. According to this theorem, a market for such
a particular good should reach an equilibrium point which corresponds also to a socially
eﬃcient level of pollution. However, the conditions mentioned by the theorem are very strict
and diﬃcult -if not impossible- to be found in the real world. Markets for all possible goods
should exist, they should all be in full equilibrium1, transaction costs should be negligible and
all participants should have access to perfect information. Otherwise, we would experience
a so-called market failure.
Why do markets fail? In the following chapter we introduce some of the main causes
(externalities and problems related to the lack of informations), and explain why the presence
of a sub-partes regulator is required for environmental policies to succeed. We study the
general theory about economic incentives introduced in order to reach a desirable level of
pollution, and the ways through which they may be used to reduce ineﬃciencies related
to market failures. Are emission taxes and subsidies preferred to a less strict, tradable
allowances system? Under which practical conditions do they work? And how can their
results be evaluated?
1A condition under which demand equals supply.
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2.1 An introduction to economic incentives for pollution
reduction
An externality is the direct consequence of an economic activity that aﬀects unrelated third
parties, who were not aware or able to inﬂuence it at the moment of its production. It may
be positive or negative, depending on what the third party experiences (either a beneﬁt
or a cost). Damages caused by greenhouse gases emissions to the environment represent a
perfect example of externalities: solutions found by producers2 to these issues will always
be diﬀerent from the optimal social ones, since there is a clear conﬂict between private and
social optimum; under the latter as a matter of fact, a private agent will not maximise his
utility function. The problem gets worse when provisions to reduce pollution are taken by
economic agents with non cooperational schemes.
A possible solution to the issue requires the introduction of a regulator in the system,
someone able to generate incentives that would cause the costs associated with the avoidance
of the normative to increase, in a way that agents would not be willing to deviate from
his intentions. Incentives are so introduced with the main aim of modifying the producers'
pollution strategies. According to Hanley et al. (2007), they should increase the costs
related to the deviation from pollution control, under a ﬂexible scenario where agents are
willing to minizime their cost function. The economic incentives may be classiﬁed into three
wide categories:
1. price rationing: these incentives try to increase the costs associated with the deviation
from the rules by imposing sanctions or subsidies that directly modify the behavior of
the polluters;
2. responsibilities rules: a set of rules containing schemes of economic incentives like
refundable deposits or ﬁnes for non-compliance, which try to induce a more responsible
behavior from polluters;
3. quantity rationing: here the focus is to obtain an accetable level of pollution by
assigning tradable allowances for emissions. This mechanism encourages less emitting
ﬁrms to reduce their pollution functions beyond law requirements, so that they can sell
their exceeding allowances to producers who face greater costs in reducing theirs. The
social gain deriving from the execution of this instrument is positive.
2From now on also indicated as ﬁrms, polluters or private agents.
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2.1.1 A desirable level of pollution
Graph 2.1: Pollution control to a socially optimal level
Graph 2.1 shows marginal costs (MC) and marginal beneﬁts (MB) associated with
pollution control; t1 and t2 represent diﬀerent values of emission taxes, whose aim is to obtain
some level of pollution reduction q. The positive slope of the marginal costs curve implies
that control costs3 increase following a growing rate, the more contamination is reduced. This
happens because the less the environment is polluted, the more costly it will be to eliminate
the last unit of q. We face the highest control costs associated with q3.
The negative slope of the marginal beneﬁts curve tells us that beneﬁts related to emission
control work in the opposite way: the more control is used, the less marginal beneﬁts for
society, until quantity q3 is reached, where MB = 0. The socially optimal level of pollution
control is found in point A, where MB = MC = t2; q2 is associated with the optimal and
most eﬃcient level of environmental quality.
Even if this scenario represents a desirable solution for society, it does not hold the same
for polluters, who do not maximise their utility functions under it. As a consequence, they
will not have incentives to invest in emission control and therefore to reach the socially
optimal point, since they would receive more beneﬁts under q = q1, associated with tax t1.
These considerations allow us to realise that polluters will pay the taxes imposed by
regulators only when these are below the marginal cost of reducing emissions, otherwise
they will invest in contamination control. It can be seen how the choice between the two
alternatives depends directly on the costs associated with each one of them. If the marginal
costs associated with pollution control are greater than the tax for unit of pollution produced,
the agents prefer to pay the tax and will not act in a way that reduces their emissions. When
3Costs caused by the reduction of environmental pollution.
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the exact contrary happens, they will prefer to invest in pollution reduction, in order not to
pay the tax.
The regulator has a great responsibility in deciding which level of taxation to adopt: if
the optimal social tax t2 is greater than the one currently charged (t1), producers will choose
once again to pay and not to reduce their emissions. The optimal level of taxation is to be
found where MC = t; this type of tax is called Pigovian, and tells us that a price is to
be assigned to the externality we are facing in order to make pollution costs internal for the
ﬁrms: by doing so, it is possible to reach a socially optimal solution.
Are these kinds of economic incentives feasible? The answer is not simple, since a regulator
trying to implement them would eventually face the lack of information about the total level
of emissions produced by an industry, and the impossibility of a punctual esteem of the
environmental damages caused by contamination. When a regulator does not hold suﬃcient
(if any) information about polluters, these will always try not to follow environmental policies,
in order not to increase their cost functions.
Therefore information asymmetry plays an important role in the subject: when draw-
ing a policy of economic incentives against pollution, one of the main factors that can inﬂuence
its success is the lack of informations available to the regulator, with respect to those at the
polluters' disposal. If a producer is able to hide or change some informations regarding his
production process to the regulator, he will always have an incentive to evade the costs re-
lated to emission control, because such a behavior will always result in additional beneﬁts
for him. On the contrary, if the regulator is able to minimise the information asymmetry,
his policies will reach a level of pollution reduction very close (if not correspondent) to the
socially optimal one.
2.2 Price rationing
2.2.1 Emission taxes
Emission taxes (or taxes for unit of emissions) represent a ﬁscal imposition that a pro-
ducer faces everytime he pollutes the environment; they are designed in a way that should
lead to pollution reduction, because their aim is to make polluters pay for at least one part
of the environmental damages they have caused. Taxes for unit of emissions released in the
environment induce producers to reduce their contamination levels to a point in which the
incremental costs associated with pollution control equal the emission tax. These contami-
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nation control costs are of course diﬀerent for every producer: the ones who face lower costs
will reduce their emissions more than the one who are dealing with higher costs. Then,
emissions taxes encourage producers to develop, acquire or modify the technology they use
to control pollution in order to decrease their cost functions, which now take into account
environmental damages too.
Empirical evidence shows that, mostly in developed realities like the United States or the
European Union, emission tax systems have proved to work quite well. However, while they
tend to increase the monetary entries of the regulator, they do not actually modify producers'
behaviors associated with pollution. Hanley et al. (2007) propose a model which explains
how emissions taxes work.
We consider the case of a ﬁrm which, by producing some kind of goods x, pollutes the
environment. Its proﬁts pi to be maximised are
pi = px− c(x)
where p is the price at which product x is sold and c(x) is the cost function associated with
the production. Such costs increase according to the production at a growing rate
∂c
∂x
> 0 and
∂2c
∂x2
< 0
Thus, the proﬁt maximisation problem for the producer is the following
max
x
[px− c(x)] (2.1)
The producer then selects an optimal level of production, xp, which maximises his proﬁts:
this happens at the point where the marginal beneﬁts of one extra unity of product equal
the marginal costs, as well as price4
MB = MC = p (2.2)
The private optimal level of production is represented in Graph 2.2: we can see how it
is diﬀerent from the social optimal one, which of course is associated with greater costs
(SMC +MC).
4In a market working under perfect conditions.
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Graph 2.2: Social and private optimal levels of production
Recalling that production has a direct consequence over environmental quality; the total
level of emissions may be represented through a linear relation α = βx where α deﬁnes
the emissions and β is a coeﬃcient telling us that when we increase production, pollution
increases as well: β = δα/δx > 0. By D(α) we represent the monetary value of emissions
damages to the environment, which increases following the pollution rate
∂D
∂α
> 0 and
∂2D
∂α2
< 0
If the producer can incorporate D, (2.1) must be rewritten as follows
max
x
[px− c(x)−D(βx)] (2.3)
Now the producer will select an optimal level x∗ at the point where marginal beneﬁts equal
the price and the sum between private and social marginal costs
MB = p =
∂c
∂x
+ β
∂D
∂α
= MC + SMC (2.4)
From Graph 2.2 we can see that level x∗ is smaller than xp (and so are the associated proﬁts),
resulting in a loss for the producer with respect to the previous situation.
Now, is it possible to make the social marginal costs ﬁt the producer's own cost function?
The answer is positive, but the regulator must be capable of estimating (and making the
producer pay) the exact amount of environmental damages associated with the production
of x; in other words a tax
t = β
∂D
∂α
(2.5)
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that causes the producer to rewrite at his maximisation problem as follows
max
x
[px− c(x)− tx] (2.6)
As a result, he will choose the new level of production which still maximises his proﬁts,
characterised by
p =
∂c
∂x
+ t (2.7)
If we take the value associated with t from (2.5) and put it into (2.7), we ﬁnd that (2.7) is
identical to (2.4). The producer has internalized the external damages caused by his produc-
tion, with the result that his private optimum is now equal to the social one.
We have just found an optimal solution for the problem, but some issues may rise when
it is time to transfer it to the real world. The main one regards the determination of en-
vironmental damages; in fact, informations regarding the physical and economic impacts of
pollution are expensive and diﬃcult to be gathered. However, if a regulator perfectly knows
what the costs and beneﬁts associated with pollution control are, he may easily reach the
optimal social level through emission taxes. We are facing a feasibility problem when this
information is not known, nor available.
According to Weitzman (1974) the eﬀectiveness of a price rationing system through
the use of emission taxes depends on the marginal beneﬁts and costs curves associated with
the pollution control expected by the regulator. There may be issues of overinvestments or
underinvestments when the expected slopes are diﬀerent from the actual ones. Steeper slopes
for marginal beneﬁts and costs associated with emission reduction mean that there will be
a greater variation in monetary values when a unit of pollution reduction q changes, while
with less steep slopes the exact opposite will happen.
CHAPTER 2. CLASSICAL TOOLS FOR POLLUTION REDUCTION 23
Graph 2.3: Constant emission tax and marginal beneﬁts curve
Graph 2.3 represents a constant marginal beneﬁts curveMB equal to a constant emission
tax t, and the marginal cost of controlling the emissions expected by the regulator, E(MC).
If these costs were equal to the actual ones, we would obtain a socially optimal level of
contamination control q∗. This is not what happens at point A: the actual reduction marginal
costs are higher than the expected ones, and the new level is qA, which is not eﬃcient. We
would experience the same ineﬃciency if the costs were smaller than the expected ones: the
level at point B will be qB.
However, in this case the emission tax is always equal to the marginal beneﬁts, so that for
any level of reduction the condition MC = MB = t holds. There are no diﬀerences between
the optimal private and the optimal social reduction level, but there is only a matter of
ineﬃciency associated with points A and B.
Graph 2.4: Constant emission tax and steep marginal beneﬁts curve
This does not hold when we have a non-constant marginal beneﬁts curve and a constant
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tax: Graph 2.4 shows diﬀerent levels of optimal reduction. Once again, with actual control
costs equal to the expected ones we will have the optimal level q∗. When costs are higher
(point A), t = MC(qA), but the condition MC = MB holds only at point B (q
∗
A), meaning
that pollution is reduced at an inferior level than the required one. The emission tax is
also smaller than the one that should be collected. Producers will not reduce their pollution
levels, since the marginal cost of reduction is higher than the emissions tax.
We observe the opposite phenomenon when costs are smaller: at point C marginal costs
equal the tax (qB), but they equal the marginal beneﬁts only at point D (q
∗
B). The pollution
reduction level is now greater than the one that leads to the social optimum, since the tax is
now over the point where MB = MC.
Graph 2.5: Constant emission tax and less-steep marginal beneﬁts curve
In Graph 2.5 we can see what happens when the marginal beneﬁts curve's slope is less
steep: the same considerations made for the case depicted in Graph 2.4 still hold, with the
only diﬀerence that here a smaller distance between qA and q
∗
A (and between qB and q
∗
B as
well) may be noticed, meaning that the negative eﬀects of the non-optimal policies are minor.
The steeper the marginal beneﬁts curve, the bigger the deviation of the policies' impact
from the optimal social levels, translating into much higher social costs. It is fundamental
for the regulator to have a complete information about the marginal costs associated with
pollution reduction, and to esteem eﬃciently emissions-caused damages, in order to introduce
policies that may reach their aim in an eﬃcient and eﬀective way.
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Graph 2.6: Constant emission tax and uncertain marginal beneﬁts curve
The last case to be analysed (Graph 2.6) is the one concerning a marginal beneﬁts curve
which is not certain5: the implementation of a policy of emission taxes under these circum-
stances will cause either an overestimation (qA) or an underestimation (qB) of the pollution
reduction levels when actual beneﬁts diﬀer from the expected ones. In all the cases where
the reduction is not equal to q∗, the implemented policies are not the optimal ones.
2.2.2 Taxes on products
In theory, emission taxes have demonstrated to be an eﬃcient solution; unfortunately, this
does not always hold in practice, mainly because of the already mentioned issues related to
information asymmetry, especially those involving moral hazard. Even if it is not directly
related to GHG emissions, for the sake of completeness of our discussion on price rationing, it
is worth mentioning an alternative solution used by regulators to avoid these problems when
they want to establish incentive policies in order to control pollution: a tax on products.
Here the polluter's behavior is inﬂuenced through a tax placed directly on the product whose
manufacturing has caused some degree of contamination. In this way, prices associated
with materials that are harmful for the environment rise, and consumers will try to ﬁnd
alternative, substitute products more eco-friendly, and not subject to taxation. Through this
system the regulator is able to control (and limit) contamination at every single step of a
good's productive cycle. Evidence shows that is widely used:
there is a wide range of environmentally related taxes currently levied in
the OECD-countries, among others: water pollution tax, batteries tax, logging
5This may happen, for example, when damages caused by pollution are not esteemed correctly.
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tax, tyres tax, beverage container tax, toxic waste levy, tax on plastic bags,
aircraft noise tax, tax on groundwater extraction, tax on pesticides, and artiﬁcial
fertilisers, landﬁll tax, ozone depletion tax... (Sollund 2007, p. 2).
One weakness of this system is that when more and more products are subject to this kind
of taxation, administrative costs inﬂate and aﬀect the achievement of economic eﬃciency.
A possible solution could be the taxation of polluting raw materials only (Hanley et al.
2007). However, the majority of reports about taxes on products have demonstrated that
they scarcely aﬀect consumers' behavior. The reason is to be found in their amount, since
-with only very few exceptions- they have been placed at an insuﬃcient level:
tax revenues raised by countries from environmentally related taxes repre-
sent on average about 2-2.5% of GDP in OECD countries, but this ﬁgure varies
signiﬁcantly among countries, from more than 3% in Scandinavian countries, the
United Kingdom, Turkey and the Netherlands, to less than 1% in the United
States. [Furthermore] this ﬁgure is not only resulting from the tax mixes but is
also inﬂuenced by the level of traditional taxes like income tax and VAT in each
country (Sollund 2007, p. 3).
2.2.3 Subsidies
Subsidies are a kind of ﬁnancial aid oﬀered to producers by the regulator, which may be
used as an incentive for pollution control. They may consist in a direct money transfer to
ﬁrms (in order to help them develop infrastructures against contamination), or in the creation
of some sort of tax reduction system. Producers may consider subsidies as an opportunity
cost: every time they decide to pollute, they are refusing to receive a concrete payment from
the regulator.
To quote some examples related to GHG emission reduction, Valsecchi et al. (2009)
mention a VAT reduction measure for domestic energy consumption in the UK, fuel tax
exemptions for biofuels in Germany or company cars taxation in the Netherlands. To inves-
tigate more deeply how subsidies work in order to reduce pollution, we take into account the
model proposed by Hanley et al. (2007).
Suppose that a producer receives a subsidy in order to produce a certain amount of
product below a level ﬁxed by the regulator (who associates to this production quantity his
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desired level of contamination). The subsidy will be equal to
s = γ(x¯− x)
where γ = D′β represents the social marginal cost associated with an x level of production.
If x = x¯, the subsidy equals zero and the producer does not receive it. If x = 0 (meaning
that the producer does not produce anymore), the subsidy will be the maximum one, s = γx¯.
In a system with subsidies, the producer has to face the following maximisation problem
max
x
pi = [px− c(x) + γ(x¯− x)]
The optimal condition is found at the point in which the marginal beneﬁts equal the price
and the sum between the marginal cost and the opportunity cost of losing the subsidy6
∂pi
∂x
= p =
∂c
∂x
+ γ
Every unit of product means a loss of one unit of subsidy γ, causing an incentive for the
producer to reduce his production until the optimal social level.
This is what happened in the previous case of emissions taxes as well: however, there
are some diﬀerences in the ways through which taxes and subsidies work if we look at the
medium/long term and consider the possibility for producers to entry and exit freely the
industry. In the short term, where the industry environment can be considered as close,
subsidies and taxes bring the same results. In the medium/long term, taxes reduce the
aggregate pollution, while subsidies increase it.
Consider Graph 2.7, showing producers entering and exiting from an industry facing
emissions taxes.
6Which is equal to the social marginal cost of producing one unit of x.
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Graph 2.7: Short and medium/long term impacts of emission taxes
Part (a) of the graph represents the behavior of a randomly chosen producer, while part
(b) depicts the industry as a whole. The average cost of a product (AC) and the marginal
costs are the following
AC =
c(x)
x
and MC =
∂c
∂x
We suppose a perfectly competitive market: there are no proﬁts (nor losses) for the producer
associated with the optimal quantity of product x∗. Perfect competition implies a perfectly
elastic aggregate supply curve S, as shown in part (b), associated with a price level p¯. We
suppose the aggregate demand curve of the industry as a whole to have a negative slope, so
that the aggregate level of production is X∗, the result of the sum of all products x∗ of all
producers. If a tax like the one described in (2.5) is introduced, the curves above have to be
rewritten as
ACt =
c(x)
x
+ t and MCt =
∂c
∂x
+ t
Part (a) of the graph shows that the two new curves are parallel to the previous ones. With
the market price still being p¯, the producer will choose the point where his marginal beneﬁts
are equal to the price and to the new marginal costs x¯; at this point, his proﬁts are negative
(pi < 0). Because of this fact, some producers will abandon the industry, and the curve [part
(b)] of aggregate supply will move upwards from S to S ′, in correspondence of the new price
level p¯′ that makes pi = 0 once again. This causes the level of aggregate products to decrease
from X∗ to X¯, and the total level of emissions caused by the industry decreases as well.
The producers who remained in business are now producing x∗, but since they are not as
many as they used to be, the total level of production (and pollution) has diminished. Taxes
have achieved their objective.
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Graph 2.8: Short and medium/long term impacts of subsidies
Graph 2.8 depicts a scenario characterised by subsidies; the curves associated with the
average cost of a product and the marginal costs are
ACs =
c(x)
x
+
ϕx¯
x
− γ and MCs = ∂c
∂x
+ γ
with ϕ being the pollution cap imposed by the regulator. The marginal cost curve is the
same that we have analysed in the tax case, since t = γ = D′β, but here the subsidy causes
the average cost curve to move to the left, reaching a lower point. Part (a) of Graph 2.8
shows how subsidies inﬂuence a producer's cost structure. Initially the producer ﬁnds himself
in point A, associated with x = x∗ and pi = 0; the introduction of a subsidy system will make
him move to point B, where the production is reduced (x¯ < x∗) and proﬁts are greater than
zero (pi > 0). The condition pi > 0 will cause new producers to enter the industry, so that the
aggregate supply curve will shift to a lower point (from S to S ′), resulting in a lower price
p¯′ and a higher level of aggregate production (from X∗ to X¯), as shown in part (b). In this
way, each ﬁrm is producing a lower quantity of products x¯′ (being x¯′ < x¯ < x∗), associated
with lower emissions, but there are more producers operating in the industry, so that the
total level of pollution tends to increase.
If there are no barriers to entry, subsidies will attract more producers, decreasing emissions
at a particular but not at a total level.
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2.3 Responsibilities rules
Responsibilities rules are a set of prescriptions that oblige producers to follow some envi-
ronmental requirements, technological restrictions or an acceptable polluting behavior. There
are many speciﬁc instruments, including even some forms of bail. We have decided however to
focus on the most important and eﬀective one: a sanction scheme where ﬁnes are introduced
in order to avoid producers' deviance from the regulator's prescriptions. Before starting, it
is useful too remind how it is often very diﬃcult to identify the exact contribution of a single
producer to the whole emissons aﬀecting the environment: a moral hazard problem must be
taken into account.
2.3.1 Sanctions: penalizing non-compliance
Starting from Holmström's (1982) works on producers' behavior in a system with incen-
tives, Xepapadeas (1991) has argued that a plausible solution for the free-riding problem7
would be to combine subsidies with a scheme based on random sanctions: if pollution in
a certain area is above the desired level, the regulator punishes at least one randomly chosen
producer. The resulting ﬁne should then be splitted in two parts: one to be used by the
regulator as a compensation for the damages to the environment, the other to be distributed
among the non-sanctioned producers.
This mechanism has some beneﬁts: for example, there are less administrative costs for
the regulator to face, since there are less informations to be gathered with respect to those
necessary for the taxes/subsidies based systems. Here the only knowledge required concerns
the total level of contamination in a given area.
However, Herriges et al. (1992) demonstrated that this scheme only works when all
the producers are risk averse, since one producer's loss constitute an actual gain for the
others. Therefore, a producer's choice to comply or not with the law will depend on his
expectations about the probability of getting ﬁned against the possibility for his competitors
to be sanctioned as well, resulting in a beneﬁt for him. Under these conditions, when the
regulator increases the sanction he is also increasing the costs and beneﬁts associated with
deviance from the regulation: producers would have to weight the possibility of getting chosen
and pay a higher ﬁne versus the one of receiving a larger quota of that sanction. However,
7Since pollution is not easily detectable, some producers may keep on contaminating the environment,
leaving to others the costs associated with emission reduction.
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if they are suﬃciently risk averse, they will give more importance to the marginal costs with
respect to the possible marginal beneﬁts associated with deviation. The prize associated
with compliance (not getting ﬁned) should exceed the one associated with deviation, and
this random-ﬁnes system would reach its objective.
To better depict this scenario, we could consider a group of producers i = 1, 2, . . . , N
where each has to choose a level qi of pollution reduction; of course the regulator wants
the quantity associated with the socially optimum q∗ to be selected, but given his inability
to control each producer's emissions he decides to introduce a system based on random
sanctions. The cap selected as the critical pollution level is represented by ϕ¯; if the actual
level ϕ ≤ ϕ¯ every producer will receive a subsidy si, expressed as a percentage ρi of total
social beneﬁts SB(a(q)) where q = (q1, q2, . . . , qN). But when ϕ > ϕ¯ producer i may be
randomly selected and ﬁned (Fi) with probability σi, or another producer j (j 6= i) may be
chosen with probability σj, and the other ones would receive the subsidy and a percentage
of the sanction (minus a compensation for the environmental damages).
Such a scheme may be summed up as follows
si − ρiSB(a(q)) ϕ ≤ ϕ¯
Si(q) = −Fi ϕ > ϕ¯ with probability σi
si + ρij[sj + Fj + Γ(a(q))] ϕ > ϕ¯ with probability σj j 6= i
where ρij = ρi/
∑
k 6=j ρk represents the percentage of producer j's ﬁne given to i, and
Γ(a(q)) = SB(a(q)) − S¯B denotes the change in social beneﬁts associated with the pol-
lution level chosen by the regulator, with Γ(a(q)) < 0 for ϕ > ϕ¯. Given this, the risk averse
producer selects the emission level that maximises his proﬁts
pii = pi
0
i − ci(qi) + Si(q)
with pi0i being the proﬁts earned in the absence of a regulator intervention. The expected
utility level of the producer when all the producers (including himself) adopt a compliance
strategy is
E[U(pii(q
∗
i , q
∗
−i))] = U(pi
0
i − ci(q∗i ) + si)
where q∗−i = (q
∗
1, q
∗
2, . . . , q
∗
i−1, q
∗
i+1, . . . , q
∗
N). If the producer decides to cheat and believes
that his competitors will stick to the regulations, the expected utility associated with devia-
tion becomes
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E[U(pii(qi, q
∗
−i))] = σiU(pi
0
i − ci(qi)− Fi) +
∑
j 6=i
σjU(pi
0
i − ci(qi) + si + ρij[sj + Fj + Γ(a(q))]
A system which combines incentives, subsidies and ﬁnes for non-compliance should bring us
to an optimal level of emission reduction if the expected utility associated with cheating is
minor than the one associated with following the rules
Ω = E[U(pii(qi, q−i))]− E[U(pii(q∗i , q∗−i))] < 0
It has been stated by Herriges et al. (1992) that an increase in the sanction level for
all the producers increases the variability of the expected beneﬁts of cheating as well. As a
consequence, if all the producers are risk averse, a loss in the expected utility associated with
following the rules and being ﬁned exceed the gain associated with cheating, Ωi < 0.
2.4 Quantity rationing
Quantity rationing introduces the idea of tradable allowances, whose raison d'être is very
simple: the ruler identiﬁes a desired level of emissions for a speciﬁc area; the allowances
equal the total level of pollution chosen, and are distributed among all the producers in that
region, who have the option to trade them. Producers that mantain their level of contam-
ination below the one assigned to them may sell -or even rent- their exceeding allowances.
Since the total level of emissions allowed is limited, they may be seen as a scarce good, and
this generates an incentive to trade. Of course the regulator must dispose of a suﬃcient
knowledge about the market, including how to establish the validity of the allowances, how
to initially asign them in a fair and eﬃcient way, and how to properly monitor the producers.
A certain degree of informations must be provided to the producers as well. Moreover, trad-
able allowances need a clear legal structure describing property rights and how transactions
may happen.
There are many criteria that a tradable allowances system has to satisfy in order to work
eﬃciently (Hahn et al. 1990):
1. the number of allowances must be limited and well deﬁned, in order to give them a
precisely esteemed value;
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2. they must be freely tradable;
3. they may be stored and still maintain their utility8;
4. transaction costs must be kept to a minimum;
5. ﬁnes associated with the violation of an allowance must be higher than its price, in
order to incentive producers to follow the rules;
6. producers must be allowed to keep any proﬁt coming from allowances' trade.
If the regulator perfectly knows the marginal costs and beneﬁts of pollution control, the level
of tradable allowances may be imposed in a way that its outcome is a socially optimal emission
reduction. This level corresponds to the point where marginal beneﬁts equal marginal costs,
like happened in Graph 2.1. With allowances traded freely, supply and demand mechanisms
should make their price equal to marginal costs and beneﬁts of pollution control, so that
p = MC = MB. Under complete certainty, this value is also equal to the emission tax:
p = MC = MB = t brings to the optimal level of pollution.
But what if the cost function is not known? We analyse three cases by looking at diﬀer-
ences in marginal beneﬁts to see if quantity rationing may be preferred to emission taxes.
Graph 2.9: Quantity rationing, part 1 of 3
In the ﬁrst one (Graph 2.9), the curve of marginal beneﬁts is a straight line parallel
to the x axis: in this situation emission taxes work poorly. The regulator will ﬁnd that the
number of tradable allowances for a desired level of pollution q∗ is at the point where marginal
beneﬁts MB equals expected maginal costs E(MC). Then, if the real marginal costs are
8Still, the possibility for the regulator to indicate an expiration date for the allowances is given.
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less than the expected ones [MC2 < E(MC)], the outcome is a level of pollution reduction
too small, since q∗ < q2: the system can not adjust itself to the minor costs if the number
of allowances is ﬁxed, resulting in an ineﬃcient, minor level of reduction. On the contrary,
if the real costs are higher than the expected ones [MC1 > E(MC)] we are using too much
control [q∗ > q1]: once again, the allowances quantity does not adjust to the control costs.
In these cases, an emissions tax system is preferable to a tradable allowances one.
Graph 2.10: Quantity rationing, part 2 of 3
Graph 2.10 shows the case of a marginal beneﬁts curve with a very negative slope. Here
tradable allowances performance well: if the real control costs are below or under the expected
marginal ones, the socially optimal level of pollution is reached, being q∗ ∼= q2 ∼= q1. In this
scenario allowances are preferred with respect to emissions taxes.
Graph 2.11: Quantity rationing, part 3 of 3
In Graph 2.11 we have the middle case where allowances result in an ineﬃciency, whose
size however is reduced with respect to the marginal beneﬁts curve with constant slope. If
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the real costs are higher than the expected ones the result is an excessive reduction level,
being q∗ > q1, and if they are smaller there is an insuﬃcient level of reduction q∗ < q2. It is
not clear if here allowances work better than emission taxes: the preferred system depends
on the slope of the marginal costs and beneﬁts curves, and on the diﬀerence between actual
and expected costs.
2.4.1 A combination of emission taxes and tradable allowances
What about a system that combines emission taxes and tradable allowances? Could it be
more eﬀective than the two separated? The idea is to combine the strenghts of both methods:
allowances protect against the possibility of generating dangerous levels of environmental
damages thanks to the existence of an incentive that reduce contamination when actual
control costs are greater than the expected ones; taxes provide an incentive to control more
pollution than allowances when actual control costs are smaller. By combining these two, we
should obtain a producer who is able to respond in a more ﬂexible way to changes in market
conditions.
Graph 2.12: A combination of incentives system
Graph 2.12 shows this case: the regulator uses such a system to approach the marginal
beneﬁts function by imposing a tax t, a subsidy s and an allowances level q∗. When the
real marginal control costs are greater than the expected ones [MC1 > E(MC)] we obtain
a contamination control level greater than the optimal one (q∗1 > q1), but not as high as it
would have been in a system where allowances are separeted from taxes: q∗ > q∗1 > q1. Taxes'
aim is to reduce the negative impact associated with high deviations from actual to expected
marginal costs. If cost allows the compliance of t > p > s, the private optimum point equals
the social one.
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In theory, this combined system should present more and more levels in order for taxes
and subsidies to get as close to the marginal beneﬁts curve as possible. This does not hold
in the real world: a tax scheme with such a high variance is obviously diﬃcult to achieve.
2.5 Practical conditions for incentives
It is worth noticing that some pratical conditions are required for economic incentives to be
used in an eﬀective way:
1. a certain level of basic informations;
2. a strong legal structure;
3. a competitive market;
4. policies must be feasible.
With respect to the ﬁrst point, the basic informations required regard the costs and beneﬁts
of diﬀerent incentive alternatives, the technological and institutional opportunities and to
which extent it is possible to control pollution. Incentives are less eﬀective when political
objectives are not clear, and when there is not a strong legal structure.
This brings us to the second point: the legislation must specify clearly the hierarchical
order of the authorities, how much and to what extent they have power over such matters.
A competitive market is also required: in the hypothesis of its absence, it would be
diﬃcult to create a tradable allowances system. Economic incentives work better in markets
characterised by a great number of buyers and sellers. These markets should also allow
instruments regarding credit, insurance policies and risk management mechanisms, otherwise
the bigger producers would have a consistent competitive advantage over the smaller ones.
Of course all these conditions must be translated into feasible policies by the regulator.
It is his duty to face the reactions of any winning or losing party from the incentive system,
which may include other regulatory entities, producers or invidivuals that may eventually
gather together and (or already have such a power to) inﬂuence the regulator's policies.
2.6 Evaluation criteria for incentives
We may evaluate how useful and easy is adoperating economic incentives by looking at four
criteria: eﬀectiveness, eﬃciency, equity and ﬂexibility. Putting aside for a moment all the
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theoretical components and looking at the situation only through a practical point of view,
an incentive scheme will fail if it is not eﬀective in reducing pollution's damages, if it is not
eﬃcient in meeting its target, if it violates social rules about equity and if it lacks of ﬂexibility
to change along with the environment surrounding it.
2.6.1 Eﬀectiveness
An incentive eﬀectiveness depends on how successfully it reaches the regulator's targets of
controlling contamination. According to Hanley et al. (2007), if the aim is to reach a certain
level of pollution, a scheme of tradable allowances is the preferred choice. In fact, it establishes
a ﬁxed quantity of emissions in a speciﬁc region and oﬀers better tools in order to predict
and control how much pollution will be, and has been, reduced. Such a mechanism should
be adopted also when the risk associated with (small) deviations is perceived as particularly
high, since it allows to narrow the potential diﬀerence between actual and required emissions.
However, if the objective is to be certain about costs associated with pollution control, a
tax system would work better. Through taxes a speciﬁc cost for emissions is achieved, but
in this case the level of pollution control is uncertain.
2.6.2 Eﬃciency
Eﬃciency means that the regulator's objectives are reached at the least possible cost. In
theory, the tradable allowances system and the one imposing taxes on emissions are equally
eﬃcient, but in practice thet may diﬀer signiﬁcantly, depending on the characteristics and the
sources of the contamination. Consider -for example- the costs associated with monitoring
and compliance: a tax on emissions requires continuous datas on quantities produced, which
are likely to be expensive. The regulator must also dispose of the suﬃcient capacity to
use such informations in order to determine an appropriate tax level, and to collect it. On
the other hand, if a tradable allowances scheme is chosen, it must have rules regarding the
transactions and the market organisation, and it has to monitor the acquisitions.
Tradable allowances should allow for more savings with respect to taxes, but this does
not hold with developing economies, where technology and administrative capabilities are
not suﬃcient.
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2.6.3 Equity
Economic incentives may inﬂuence the distribution of costs and beneﬁts among society mem-
bers, with obvious eﬀects on equality. It is the regulator's duty to identify the winners (who
capture the beneﬁts of a cleaner environment) and the losers (who face the costs related
to it). Should it be recognized to a producer some kind of right to pollute? Or must he
face alone the damages and costs caused by his emissions? Some strict measures may have
a negative inﬂuence on the producer's operations, with bad eﬀects over working places or
economic growth. If a tax increases production costs and makes a producer not competitive
in the market, he may cease his activity or move to another country.
There might also be equity issues regarding the location of an activity: polluting a speciﬁc
area may have greater consequences compared to another one, so that an uniform tax on
emissions may be perceived as unfair.
If we move our focus, it may be noticed that a regulator concerned with equity should also
know in which measure an incentive system may be transferred from producers to consumers
(by rising the price of the products), or to workers (by decreasing the salary levels).
2.6.4 Flexibility
The regulator should be able to adapt incentives to changes in market or technology, not to
mention social, political and environmental conditions. If we take the example of taxes on
emissions, ﬂexibility is crucial in order for the regulator to respond to pollution variations.
If modifying a tax requires more levels of authorities, change may be too slow to be eﬃcient.
The tax's ﬂexibility should also be considered when dealing with nations characterised by
high levels of inﬂation.
Tradable allowances are concerned with this feature too, since their system assigns a
speciﬁc value to transactions among producers in the market. These prices should be adjusted
in case of economic, technologic and inﬂation changes as well. Due to this characteristics,
tradable allowances may provide more price ﬂexibility than emission taxes, but less ﬂexibility
regarding the total level of emissions.

Chapter 3
GHG as a transboundary pollution
problem
Transboundary pollution is deﬁned as follows:
a pollution that originates in one country but, by crossing the border through
pathways of water or air, is able to cause damage to the environment in another
country (OECD 1997).
The deﬁnition involves the presence of at least two juridically independent entities: since
emissions do not respect borders, the contamination caused by a polluter usually have neg-
ative eﬀects not only within his home country, but also in the surrounding nations. This of
course does not refer only to geographically close nations: as our analysis focuses on negative
eﬀects produced by greenhouse gases on the environment, data1 show that the corresponding
process of global warming is inﬂuenced more by great polluters like China or the United
States, rather than by the state of Kiribati, Oceania. Nevertheless, this little island and its
population of 103,000 people are more likely to suﬀer sooner the resulting dramatic conse-
quences than the two polluters we have mentioned: in 2014 its government was forced to
buy some territories from Fiji, planning to move there all of its residents if the oceans' level
increase induced by climate change will continue its growing trend.
As a result of situations like this one, it is clear that transboundary pollution deals with
themes of fairness and equity: generally air pollution may be transported over hundreds
(even thousands) kilometres, meaning that, when it is ﬁnally deposited, its negative impacts
are experienced in areas far away from their original sources. Moreover, when we refer to
1From the World Bank organisation, availble at <http://www.worldbank.org>.
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GHG contamination, damages coming from this type of pollution aﬀect directly the Earth's
atmosphere as a whole. This means that a country which has made huge investments in
renewable energy sources and tries its best to reduce the impact of its emissions over the
environment will suﬀer because of the pollution originated in another state. Since in these
kinds of problems more than one independent jurisdiction is involved, the issue gets more
complicated with respect to what we have seen in Chapter 2. There is currently no such
thing as a sovranational institution capable of imposing its will, penalizing the nations that
do not respect the treaties signed or rewarding the ones that behave correctly.
In Chapter 4 we analyse the major and most recent steps taken from a legal point of view
in order for countries to reduce their GHG emissions, but we underline how the adherence
of states to these kinds of treaties always happens on a voluntary basis: since there are no
central entities capable of forcing some kind of environmental-friendly behavior to the world
nations, the last word on such policies belong -in the end- to a country's own government.
3.1 The role of greenhouse gases
We have chosen to focus our analysis on the most discussed transboundary pollution problem,
one that aﬀects the world as a whole, with no regards of where the original source of pollution
is located. We are talking about greenhouse gases (GHG), which are deﬁned as:
those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic,
that absorb and emit radiation at speciﬁc wave-lenghts within the spectrum of
thermal infrared radiation emitted by the Earth's surface, the atmosphere itself,
and by clouds (Bernstein et al. 2008, p. 82).
The most important types that can be found in the atmosphere are water vapor (H2O),
carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), methane (CH4) and ozone (O3); some, like the
halocarbons and other substances containing chlorine and bromine, are entirely human-made.
However, it is carbon dioxide which has been identiﬁed as the principal anthropogenic
greenhouse gas causing climate change, as it is a by-product of burning fossil fuels from fossil
carbon deposits like gas, oil and coal. It was chosen to be the reference greenhouse gas, the
one on whose basis the others' negative eﬀects are measured using the so called GWP, global
warming potential.
Without entering too much into details about how GHG work, the Sun radiate towards
the Earth the energy responsible for its climate at a very short wavelenght (the ultraviolet
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section of the spectrum). Almost one third of this solar energy that reaches the top of our
atmosphere is sent back through a process of reﬂection, while the remaining two thirds are
absorbed in part by the atmosphere itself, and in a greater part by the Earth's surface.
In order for the incoming energy to be balanced, the same amount must be radiated back
to space, and this time infrared radiations (characterised by longer wavelenghts) are used,
because of the great diﬀerence in temperature between our planet and the Sun. Greenhouse
gases, the ones which absorb the thermal infrared radiation, are then fundamental to ensure
life on Earth, since they indirectly regulate the average temperature on its surface. It has
been estimeed (Le Treut et al. 2007) that without their presence we would experience a
15°C decrease in the average terrestrial temperature.
An increase in their concentration would cause (and is causing) an increased infrared
opacity of the atmosphere, along with a rise of the Earth's surface temperature. This is what
has happened since the Industrial Revolution (1750): human industrial production based on
fossil fuels -and its related negative side-eﬀects, like deforestation- is responsible for a 40%
increase of the carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere (Bernstein et al. 2008).
As a result, it is a proven fact that in the last two centuries surface temperatures have
followed an increasing rate in basically every nation, as shown by a variety of heterogeneous
studies: from Köppen (1881) to Brohan et al. (2006)2. Since Köppen's measurements, the
Earth's surface has been warmed of an average of 0.85°C.
3.1.1 The 2°C threshold
To ﬁght climate change, policy makers must ﬁrst ﬁnd an answer to a complicated issue: how
much temperature rise our planet can tolerate, with respect to the pre-industrial average
levels.
A maximum 2°C increase by the end of the current century (2100) is the limit that
has dominated the prevailing views over such matter in the last twenty years. At a scientiﬁc
level, it was ﬁrst mentioned in 1990, when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) produced its ﬁrst report underlying how grave damages to ecosystems and non
linear responses would have followed the overtaking of such a threshold. Since there, it
has become a shared target among policy makers and scientists: it was explicitly mentioned
in the Copenhagen accord (2009), which was initially signed by 114 countries, and formally
incorporated in the Cancun agreement (2010): from then it formed the basis of the following
2Both mentioned in Le Treut et al. 2006.
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negotiations.
However, even getting close to the 2°C rise without surpassing it would not solve the
negative eﬀects related to global warming. It was meant to be the ultimate target not to
be crossed in order to avoid catastrophic and unsolvable consequences, but it does not come
without serious side- eﬀects:
Crop yields [could] decline in parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America; sea
level rise [could] cause coastal ﬂooding and saline intrusion into freshwater re-
sources; low-lying islands may face a long term existential threat (Committee
on climate change 2015, p. 21);
just to mention a few, are nowadays unfortunately seen as inevitable. Such a slightly under
the cap result would bring enormous losses with respect to global economy and agriculture,
but it still represents a somehow desirable objective, which is currently not impossible to
achieve. As severe as its collateral damages may seem, they are almost negligible when
compared to what would be associated with surpassing the threshold by, for example, two
further degrees (reaching a total of 4°C increase):
Roughly 3-30 million additional people could suﬀer coastal ﬂooding each year
due to 4°C warming, even assuming defences continue to improve with rising
population and wealth [...]. Around 50-65% of plant and amphibian species, and
around 25-40% of bird and mammal species are expected to lose at least half of
their suitable climatic range. (Committee on climate change 2015, p. 23).
Critics on the 2°C threshold
While being widely shared, the 2°C cap has also gathered many critics. It has been seen as
a somehow arbitrary and overly simplifying measure:
[This] target has emerged nearly by chance, and it has evolved in a somewhat
contradictory fashion: policy makers have treated it as a scientiﬁc result, scientists
as a political issue (Jaeger et al. 2010, p. 25).
According to Tschakert (2015) it is simply too high: it should be substitued with a more
eﬀective 1.5°C, since temperature rises are not equally and uniformally distributed among
the world nations; to quote an example, an increase of two degrees at a global level would
eventually result in a 3.5°C rising in some parts of Africa.
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The 2013 IPCC's Fifth assessment report was the ﬁrts one mentioning the possible inad-
equacy of limiting emissions-caused global warming to 2°C:
[recent] studies indicate a threshold of 2°C [...] with respect to pre-industrial
levels for near-complete loss of the Greenland ice sheet (Church et al. 2013, p.
1170)
Most of Caribbean and Paciﬁc Island countries would therefore suﬀer dramatic consequences
due to the sea-level rising.
The idea of a 1.5°C limit as a substitute for the 2°C one was expressed for the ﬁrst time
-once again- in the Copenhagen accord ; in its ﬁnal part, the decision on the ideal objective
was postponed to 2015, on the occasion of COP21:
We call for an assessment of the implementation of this accord to be com-
pleted by 2015, including [...] consideration of strengthening the long term goal
[...] including in relation to temperature rises of 1.5 degrees Celsius (Copenhagen
accord 2009, art. 12).
3.2 The Chinese example
Data show that global warming caused by greenhouse gases is now more than ever a concrete,
almost tangible threat that must heavily addressed as soon as possible. However, despite the
fact that the whole world may suﬀer the catastrophic eﬀects we have enumerated, the lack
of a central, sovranational authority we have mentioned in the introduction of this chapter
makes it more diﬃcult for countries to ﬁnd a commonly shared, legally-binding agreement.
Is it possible for a whole nation to change its mentality and attitude towards environmental
issues?
In this sense, the example of China may be peculiar with respect to our analysis. The
country is the world's worst polluter since 2006, when it surpassed the United States in
this unpleasant ranking. Obviously there is no sovranational entity capable of forcing China
to reduce its emissions or to invest in renewable resources, and in the past the country has
always been reluctant to take signiﬁcant steps in this direction. Something must change in its
government's attitude in order for China to voluntarily adhere to some sort of international
legislation against GHG-caused transboundary pollution.
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A curious coincidence happened on December 7, 2015: while all the world nations were
attending the COP21 in Paris, negotiating for emission reduction, Beijing reached its highest
level of PM2.5 (an atmospheric particulate characterised by a ﬁne diameter of 2.5 micrometres
or less): 291 micrograms per cubic metre3 (at 07:00 am, local time). It is of course an ex-
tremely dangerous quantity, since the World Health Organisation recommends 25 micrograms
(a volume almost 12 times lower) as the maximum safe level.
Traﬃc thinned and construction sites went silent on Tuesday as the Chinese
capital carried out its highest-level pollution alert for the ﬁrst time, a move experts
said marked oﬃcial acknowledgment of public perception that previous bouts of
bad air had been played down. City oﬃcials restricted industrial production and
urged schools to shut their doors among other three-day emergency measures
enacted on Tuesday after the city issued what it calls a red alert over pollution
levels (Chen 2015).
A measure like this was not easily taken: the red alert was called for the very ﬁrst time in the
history of the nation, provoking huge social costs: the shutdown of outdoor constructions and
schools and the heavy traﬃc limitations (half the vehicles were forced not to circulate) -just
to mention a few- are very likely to have important consequences on the country's economy
if these pollution levels will be regularly reached from now on. According to the same data
source, from 2008 to 2015 almost 7 out of 10 days in the city registered an unhealthy, very
unhealthy or hazardous level of air quality, while only 2 out of 100 were considered good.
This is one of the reasons why, with the words of McGrath, the BBC environment
correspondent for the COP21,
something is changing, as the growing public pressure [in China] is starting to
make a diﬀerence. A strong agreement in Paris won't immediately solve China's
air woes, but if it ultimately pushes down the price of renewables even further, it
could play a part in solving the issue long term (McGrath 2015).
Historically, the Chinese government had been unwilling to commit to important targets
when it came to greenhouse gases reduction, since the country has always relied heavily on
coal, which still accounts for more than 60% of its power nowadays. As we mentioned, the
country is indeed the worst polluter at a global level, but it has always refused to fully face
this fact by claiming that other countries, like the US, have a way larger per capita amount
3Data from the US Embassy's air pollution monitor in Beijing.
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of emissions. However, major investments in renewable energy sources have been made in
the last years, and facts like the one that recently happened in Bejing are forcing China to
realise how it must cut its dependence on fossil fuels in order to survive or, according to less
catastrophic scenarios, remain competitive at a global level.
The country is starting to move its ﬁrst, important steps towards pollution reduction, and
it is also thanks to its previous commitments that in 2015 global emissions of carbon dioxide
suﬀered a decline of 0.6%, as was shown by the scientiﬁc journal Nature climate change at
the COP21. It is the ﬁrst time in the world history that such a downturn is experienced since
the economy as we know it started growing through the Industrial Revolution.
Maybe something is really changing.

Chapter 4
Global results against climate change
One of the main reasons why it is so diﬃcult to reduce emission levels is because pollution
sources are often located in other jurisdictions, far from the local regulator. The example
we have previously mentioned is the one of carbon dioxide emissions, which negatively aﬀect
the planet as a whole, with no regards of where they were originally produced. This kind of
polluters' behavior does make sense under an economic point of view, as it is perfectly ratio-
nal: when beneﬁts associated with production mainly remain inside an area -a jurisdiction-,
but part of the resulting costs (pollution) may be exported (by means of wind) to other
jurisdictions, it will cause a production of pollution exceeding the socially optimal one. It is
the well-known free-riding problem, that we have already mentioned in Chapter 2.
The only way to solve such an issue is for regulators to stop looking exclusively at their
own jurisdiction: all the parties involved, the polluters and the pollutees, should negotiate the
optimal level of pollution at an interjurisdictional level. The more countries are involved
in signing such a legally-binding agreement, the more eﬀective the outcome will be.
The Coase Theorem, by the namesake, Nobel winner R. Coase, states that:
If one assumes rationality, no transaction costs, and no legal impediments to
bargaining, all misallocations of resources would be fully cured in the market by
bargains (Calabresi 1968, p. 68)
By applying it to environmental economics, we ﬁnd that it does not matter which part has
an actual right to contaminate. Independently from who is the right-holder, the parties in-
volved will always have an incentive to negotiate until reaching the point where marginal
costs and beneﬁts of boths are equal. However, this will not happen in presence of lacks of
information, damages diversity, high costs of transactions: the market itself is not currently
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able to solutionate this problem. When interjurisdictional externalities like pollution exist,
a higher level of jurisdiction is required: a system with powers over the diﬀerent countries
involved.
In Chapter 5 we start a brief resume of the main features of game theory, and therefore
introduce the concept of cooperative games, seeing how two or more players may come
to an arrangement and act like a single one, with a unique payoﬀ - to be later shared
among them- higher than the one that would have been reached under a non-cooperative
situation. Nevertheless, in Chapter 2 we have already seen that this type of scheme is the one
through which it is possible to control environmental damages by reaching an eﬃcient level
of pollution: every player, or ﬁrm, produces a certain rate of products, leading to a certain
proﬁt that he wants to maximise. If we stick to the polluter pays principle1, environmental
damages caused by emissions must become a part of each producer's cost function. We have
seen that in order to force ﬁrms into cooperation, a sovereign entity (the regulator) must
be introduced in the game. In the following chapter, we analyse what has been done at a
global level to induce nations to cooperate in the ﬁght against climate change caused by GHG
emissions. It is a long path, full of (many) failures and (fewer) successes, which however has
been eventually able to create the historical, ﬁrst universal agreement on climate: the Paris
agreement, presented to the world at the end of the COP21.
4.1 Building the basis for COP21
As the number indicates, COP21 was not the ﬁrst meeting among the world's leaders to
discuss environmental themes and climate change: on the contrary, there is a long history
of conferences and treaties, achievements and -more frequently- failures behind it. We have
chosen to focus on four years, all mentioned in the COP21 ﬁnal draft, whose contribution
to the agreement reached in Paris on December 2015 was signiﬁcant: 1992, 1997, 2010 and
2012.
It all started with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which was
instituted in 1988 under the spur of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), both belonging to the UN, and which
deﬁnes itself as the leading international body for the assessment of climate change2. Two
1As it happens in the OECD and EU countries.
2Source: <http://www.ipcc.ch>
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years later, the IPCC published its ﬁrst assessment report3, depicting future dramatic conse-
quences for the world as a whole, as a result of an indiscriminate GHG emission production
by all nations. It also underlined how some serious committments were to be taken soon,
otherwise a business as usual situation would have brought to:
an eﬀective doubling of CO2 in the atmosphere between now and 2025 to
2050 [...]; a consequent increase of global mean temperature in the range of 1.5°C
to 4°-5°C [with] an unequal global distribution [...] and a sea-level rise of about
0.3-0.5 m by 2050 and about 1 m by 2100 (Tegart et al. 1990, p.1).
Heavy repercussions would have aﬀected forests, desertiﬁcation, aquatic ecosystems and hu-
man health as well. As a direct result of these scientiﬁc prediction, in 1992 the UN held a
conference in Rio de Janeiro.
4.1.1 1992: the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit
From June 3 to 14, 1992 most of world nations reunited in Rio de Janeiro for the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as the Rio de
Janeiro Earth Summit.
It was not the ﬁrst time they assembled together to discuss environmental-related issues,
but this summit went down in history for its size. The participants' number was truly
impressive: 183 nations represented by over 10.000 delegates, a hundred heads of state, over
30.000 people (environmentalists, journalists, experts...) from all over the world. The purpose
of the Earth Summit was stated in the previous 44/228 UN resolution (1989); in one of its
articles, it speciﬁcally mentioned that during the 1992 conference
[strategies and measures were to be elaborated in order to] halt and reverse
the eﬀects of environmental degradation in the context of increased national and
international eﬀorts to promote sustainable and environmentally sound develop-
ment in all countries (resolution 44/228 1989, art 3 part I).
Feasible solutions were needed to address in particular climate change and greenhouse gases
emission (art. 12, part I); developed countries were also recognized as the main cause of
pollution, and therefore identiﬁed as the principal responsibles for its reduction.
Most of the expected outcomes of the summit were not achieved because of the emerging
of opposing positions: the already developed part of the planet was willing to protect the
3Four more would have followed, the last one in 2014.
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environment as a whole and to slightly modify its polluting behaviors (with some exceptions),
while the less-developed, emerging one did not want to give up its future development based,
for convenience reasons, on economical fossil fuels. These diﬀerent demands were diﬃcult to
be mediated; however, it was thanks to the Rio conference that a concept emerged, an idea
which as naive as it may seem now was stated there for the ﬁrst time: the future economic
development had to be environmentally sustainable.
This position was the basis for the writing of a document, the Rio declaration on en-
vironment and development, which was not a legally-binding agreement but a simple and
quite broad declaration of political intents for a next future. Through its 27 principles,
some main, basic statements over environment and development were expressed, reaﬃrming
-as expressed in the preamble- the ones already stated in the previous Stockholm declaration
(1972). Among these principles, some are particularly interesting on the basis of our analysis:
States have [...] the sovereign right to exploit their own resources [but also]
the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do
not cause damage to the environment of other States [principle 2]; States shall
cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the
health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem, [having] common but diﬀerenti-
ated responsibilities [principle 7] (Rio declaration on environment and
development 1992)
along with the ones wishing a cooperation among nations with the objective of progressively
building up some sort of environmental international right (principles 13 and 27). Another
voluntarily-implemented, non legally-binding document resulting from the summit was the
Agenda 21, which, despite its less preminent juridical impact (with respect to the other pa-
pers), still represented a valid action plan on how to achieve a sustainable development. Its
objective was to realise the complete integration between environmental care and economic
development, having international cooperation among nations as a compass. Its second sec-
tion (out of a total of four) speciﬁcally mentiones GHG emission reduction as one of the main
objectives to be implemented.
The declaration and the agenda were not the only results of the summit: three legally-
binding agreements were opened for signature, collectively known as the Rio convention. The
ﬁrst ones -Convention on biological diversity and the United Nations convention to combat
desertiﬁcation- do not strictly concern our analysis, while the third one -the United Nations
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framework convention on climate change (UNFCCC)- deserves some attention. It was signed
by 154 countries4, and was intended as a framework convention, an international agreement
whose details are delegated to the single nations ratifying it.
As a matter of fact, this international treaty generally expressed a commitment to ini-
tiate a process of greenhouse gas concentrations reduction, with no references to some sort
of schedule or to mandatory actions. Its speciﬁc aims were to promote the knowledge, in
each nation, about all types of emissions and their related damages, to encourage scientiﬁc
researches on climate change due to GHG emissions, and to stimulate policies against pol-
lution at a national and regional level. However, it included the possibility of negotiating
more speciﬁc international treaties -protocols- with more strict limits concerning GHG emis-
sion reduction. It is worth noticing that there was also a speciﬁcally mentioned diﬀerence
in the results expected from developed countries, since the convention took as inevitable a
GHG emission rise in developing countries for the following years, both for their necessity to
address social and development issues, both for their dependence on fossil fuels.
The origins of the Paris agreement are to be found in this convention, since after its
ratiﬁcation all the parties involved agreed to meet every year in the so called Conferences
of the Parties (COP). The ﬁrst COP (Berlin 1995) was not very eﬀective, while the second
one (Geneva 1996) made signiﬁcant steps in recognizing that climate change was an actual
phenomenon, demonstrated by evidences and validated by the scientiﬁc community, and that
medium-term targets were to be taken and legally enforced. The set was ready for COP 3
(discussed in Subsection 4.1.2), which took place in Kyoto in December 1997.
Summing up, the Earth Summit in Rio was welcomed as a possible, concrete solution to
problems like climate change, whose real gravity was started to be perceived. It may have
disappointed those expectations, but it surely represented a valid starting point for a dialogue
over GHG emission reduction: the UNCED eventually promoted the entry of environmental
issues and sustainable development (Potter et al. 2003, p.183) in the global agenda.
Parties to the UNFCCC
Another important feature of the convention was the division of world countries into the
following groups:
4Which are now 196, all member states of the UN, including other entities like the European Union as a
whole.
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1. Annex I Parties are the industrialised, developed countries that were already mem-
bers of the OECD in 1992, and those nations with economies in transition. They
include the Russian federation and several Central and Eastern European states.
2. Annex II Parties include the OECD members of the previous group, but not the
economies in transition. They are responsible for the ﬁnancial needs of developing
countries in the ﬁght against climate change.
3. Non-Annex I Parties represent mostly developing countries; some groups of nations
are recognised as especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change,
some form part of the LDC sub-classiﬁcation. These are Least Developed Countries,
whose limited capacity to reduce emissions and control pollution levels is recognised
and ﬁnancially helped.
4.1.2 1997: the Kyoto protocol
The main result of COP3 (Kyoto 1997) was the Kyoto protocol, which represented for years a
milestone with regards to the ﬁght against climate change. The document is an international,
legally-binding treaty (for parties that -on a voluntary basis- chose to ratify it) which recog-
nises global warming as an undoubtful, anthropogenic eﬀect of GHG emissions; its parties
are therefore obliged to reduce them to bearable limits, through a series of local policies and
measures and international ﬂexibility mechanisms. In particular, the protocol sets tar-
gets concerning the production of six particular greenhouse gases (Annex A): carbon dioxide
(CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydroﬂuorocarbons (HFCs), perﬂuorocarbons
(PFCs) and sulphur hexaﬂuoride (SF6), all translated into CO2 equivalents in order to de-
termine common reduction levels. Furthermore, a series of secondary activities concerning
with accounting, reporting and review was implemented, as well as a Compliance Committee
in order to vigilate on the observance by Parties of the determined objectives.
The protocol entered into force on February 16, 2005 -eight year after its drafting- when
the condition of being ratiﬁed by at least 55 states5 (art. 25) was fulﬁlled. To the present date,
192 parties have signed it -including the European Union as a whole6-, one has withdrawn
from it (Canada) and one of its signatories has not ratiﬁed it yet (USA). Its ﬁrst commitment
period (see Subsection 4.1.4 for the second one) covered the years from 2008 to 2012; by
5Including Annex I Parties representing 55% of 1990 levels of CO2 emissions
6Whose states are authorized to work jointly by art. 4.
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the end of that year, the objective for total emission reduction was to achieve a 5.2% decrease
with respect to the 1990 levels (art. 3). Let us examine this goal more precisely.
Article 10 of the protocol states that it is based on the principle of common but diﬀer-
entiated responsibilities, resulting in the fact that developed countries are identiﬁed as the
responsible for the current GHG levels in the atmosphere: the main abatement measures for
their reduction, as well as the ﬁnancial aids for developing countries in order to assure them an
environmentally sustainable development, should come from them. As a matter of fact, only
Annex I Parties have chosen to commit themselves to some reduction targets, to be achieved
on a national or joint basis. Non-Annex I Parties do not have legally-binding objectives, but
can still participate in the ﬁght against global warming: for example, the clean development
mechanism, later explained, is one of the measures directly aimed to them. The limitations
of GHG emissions are not the same for each country: they were calculated below, at or in
some cases even above the base year's ones. In turn, even the base year is not universally
shared: while being 1990 for most countries, there are ﬁve exceptions7 which have chosen
years or averages in the period from 1985 to 1989 as their references. We have selected six
among the most important Annex I Parties and shown their respective commitments as a
percentage of the base year in the following table:
Annex I Party Commitment Base year
Australia 108% 1990
Canada 94% 1990
EU ≈ 95.6% 1990
Japan 94% 1990
Russian federation 100% 1990
USA 93% 1990
Table 4.1: 2008-2012 Kyoto GHG emission targets for some Annex I parties
Two things must be underlined: the EU commitment has been calculated as an average
of the EU15 individual targets, with the lowest level (72%) belonging to Luxembourg and
the highest one (125%) to Greece; USA are considered among the parties since they did sign
the protocol, but it is useful to remind that they have not ratify it yet.
7Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovenia.
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How to achieve Kyoto emission targets
There are two methods for Annex I Parties to achieve such a decrease in GHG emission
levels. The ﬁrst one are general policies and measures to be implemented on a national and
regional basis: into this category fall all those speciﬁc implementing programs like the im-
provement of industries' energy eﬃciency, the promotion of sustainable means of agriculture,
the development of renewable energy sources, etc.
The second method is composed by three diﬀerent ﬂexibility mechanisms: joint implemen-
tation (art. 6), clean development mechanism (art. 12) and international emissions trading
(art. 17). On the opposite of local policies, all these means act at an international level and
allow GHG emission reduction activities implemented by a country out of its jurisdiction
to count in determining the reach of its determined quota. We recall from Chapter 3 that
global warming is a transboundary pollution problem: therefore, every measure to reduce
GHG-caused pollution is eﬀective without regards of where it is conceived.
The three mechanisms are available for utilisation by all Annex I Parties, at the following
conditions:
 they have to ratiﬁy the Kyoto protocol ;
 they have to calculate their assigned quota of CO2 equivalents (in tonnes);
 they have to implement a system on a national basis to estimate GHG emissions, and
transmit such informations to the UNFCCC secretariat every year;
 they have to create a national register to account for GHG emissions quota released,
owned, transferred, repaid and erased, and transmit such informations to the UNFCCC
secretariat every year;
 they have to demonstrate that the use would only have been an addiction to the courses
of actions already undertaken at a national level.
The aim of joint implementation is to promote a collaboration between developed countries
and economies in transaction, in order for both to reach their own reduction objectives in an
eﬃcient way. Annex I Parties may invest into emission reduction projects in the territory
of any other such Party; in this way, the global cost of fulﬁlling Kyoto obligations should
be reduced, enabling Parties to abate emissions where is more convenient. The pollution
which has been avoided thanks to these projects allows funding countries to achieve emission
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credits (called ERU, Emission Reduction Units), that may be used for the compliance with
their own Kyoto reduction objectives.
The second international mean to abate contamination levels is a clean development
mechanism, which works in a similar way. Once again, a process of collaboration is induced:
countries (or companies8) realising projects based on a clean technology (one that abates
GHG emissions) in developing countries (therefore Non-Annex I Parties) receive emission
credits equal to the pollution reduction achieved through their intervention, on the basis of
a what would have otherwise been emitted scenario without the project. These are known
as CER, Certiﬁed Emission Reductions, and may be sold to the market or stored. This
mechanism involves energy eﬃciency, renewable energy comercialisation and fuel switching,
and has been widely use: estimates by World Bank calculate its related pollution abatement
to be ten times the one reached through joint implementation.
The ﬁrst two methods are also known as project-based mechanisms, since, despite their
diﬀerences regarding methods or the recipients of their actions, both are funded on a tech-
nological program to be implemented in order to meet Kyoto levels. The third one is deeply
diﬀerent, since it is based on the cap-and-trade system we have mentioned in Section 2.4:
the international emissions trading system allows states (companies) to buy from and
sell to other states (companies) a certain amount of emission permits, in order for their GHG
emissions to meet their originally assigned quota. The party will sell its tradable allowances
on the market with its level of emissions being under the quota, and buy them otherwise. The
allowances are called AAU, Assigned Amount Units, while the original quotas were agreed
by the Annex I Parties involved in the protocol and are stated its ﬁnal part (Annex B).
The trading was restricted to the 5 years compliance period from 2008 to 2012, and allowed
among Annex I Parties that have agreed to the GHG emission limitation (art. 17).
Emission trading schemes (ETS) were successfully implemented in many Annex I Parties.
However, it must be noticed that the one implemented by the EU (the so-called EU ETS)
is the only involving more than one jurisdictional entity: all the 28 EU states plus Iceland,
Liechtenstein and Norway. A tradable system for GHG emission allowances was constituted
by countries like Australia (2003), Canada (2007), Switzerland (2008), the US (2009) or Japan
(2010), but it was limited to their territory and saw no other national entities included.
8Under the responsibility of their home nations, as determined in the Marrakech Accords (2001).
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Sanctions
Sanctions for non-compliance with the protocol were decided at the COP11 (Montreal 2005)
through the UNFCCC Decision 27/CMP.1. The purpose of the decision was to facilitate,
promote and strenghten the meeting of the Kyoto targets through a transparent system.
There are no direct economic ﬁnes for countries failing to reach their objective; however,
the following sanctions are to be applied:
 30% surcharge on the emission quantity missed to meet compliance to be added to the
post 2012 quota;
 adoption of an action plan for the meeting of the targets;
 Annex I Parties may be prevented from taking part to further emissions trading.
As a result, non-compliance may result costly, in terms of international credibility, increase
of the post 2012 obligations and risk of being ousted from emissions trading.
To this point the Canadian case is emblematic: since there are no ﬁnes forecasted for
parties withdrawing from the protocol (art. 27), the nation decided to abandon the pro-
gram in 2011, ﬁnding itself in the impossibility of respecting the agreement (6% of pollution
reduction by the end of 2012, with respect to its 1990 levels). As a matter of fact, what
happened between 1990 and 2008 was the exact opposite: Canada experienced an increase
of 24.1%9 of GHG emissions. By exiting the Kyoto protocol, the country experienced only a
slight damage (if any at all) in its international reputation, without direct consequences on
its economy. On the contrary, heavy penalties would have arised for the country if it had
not withdrawn: it avoided an estimated US$14 billion in penalties resulting from its failure
to miss the Kyoto target (Jull 2012). The sum was calculated by the former Canadian
minister of the environment, P. Kent, on the basis of the 30% surcharge for the second
period and on one of the protocol's options, suggesting that a non-compliant party has to
purchase emission credits from another state to eventually meet its target.
4.1.3 2010: the road towards the Cancun agreement
From 1997 to 2010 thirteen Conferences of the Parties took place10. Given that none was
as remarkable as the Japanese one, no important conclusions were reached either, with few
9Data comes from a 2010 UNFCCC report.
10In 2001 two COP were held, in Germany and Morocco.
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exceptions.
COP6 (Bonn 2001) and COP7 (Marrakech 2001) saw the rejection of the Kyoto proto-
col by the US -which became an observer country- and the acceptance of the three ﬂexible
mechanisms we have mentioned in Subsection 4.1.2, with the appropriate compliance and
sanctionatory mechanisms. During COP10 (Buenos Aires 2004) the post-Kyoto period was
mentioned for the ﬁrst time, and discussions on how to allocate emission reduction after
2012 began. On February 16, 2005 the Kyoto protocol entered into force and the same-year
COP11 (Montreal 2005) was also the ﬁrst Meeting of the Parties (MOP).
Three years later, COP15 (Copenhagen 2009) was welcomed with high expectations. It
was attended by over 100 world leaders, and accomplished the drafting of a document, the
Copenhagen accord, a non-legally-binding resolution signed by 141 countries11 (accounting
for 87.5% of the world GHG emissions) and taken note of, but not formally adopted, by
the COP itself.
The accord attests the recognition of climate change as a fundamental threat for the world
nations, agreeing -for the ﬁrst time- on the need to limit further temperature rise to 2°C
(recall Subsection 3.1.1). The path to reach a certain quota of GHG emission reduction
was set in diﬀerent ways for Annex I and non-Annex I Parties. The ﬁrst ones had to commit
to the emission targets for 2020 submitted by themselves by the end of the following year
to the secretariat (art.4); the objectives for the Annex I Parties that we have previously
considered with regards to the Kyoto protocol are shown in the table12:
Annex I Party Emission pledge by 2020 Compared to
Australia 5 - 25% 2000
Canada 17% 2005
EU 20 - 30% 1990
Japan 25% 1990
Russian federation 15 - 25% 1990
USA 17% 2005
Table 4.2: Levels of GHG emission pledges by 2020 for some Annex I parties
11As of 2015.
12Data from: <http://www.usclimatenetwork.org>.
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Being developing countries, non-Annex I Parties only had to generally implement mit-
igation actions, while least developed countries and small island developing states might
undertake voluntary actions, on the basis of international support (art. 5). Moreover, de-
veloping countries were also indicated as the most needy of incentives, in order to reach a
sustainable development by following a low emission pathway (art. 7). The task of raising
those funds was granted to their developed homologous: US$30 billion for the period 2010-
2012, and US$100 billion a year by 2020 (art. 8).
The following year COP16 (Cancun 2010) was the natural consequence of Copenhagen.
The 2°C threshold was formally incorporated, as well as the possibility of its re-evaluation
in 2015, oﬃcially introducing the idea of a possible, further decrease of 0.5°C. All Annex I
Parties submitted their emission targets (Table 4.1), while other countries and emerging
economies also contributed by submitting their action plans. All of this happened on a
pledge-and-review basis, meaning that nations acted -once again- on a voluntary, non-legally-
binding plan. Finally, the Cancun agreement called for the creation of a Green Climate Fund
to help developing countries to mitigate their GHG emissions, and established an Adaptation
Framework to coordinate national and regional adaptation plans.
4.1.4 2012: the Doha amendment to the Kyoto protocol
With respect to what was done in the previous years, during COP17 (Durban 2011) the
parties returned to a more rules-based approach. The main result of the conference was to
explicitly start the negotiations of a legally-binding document, regarding all countries, that
would have ﬂown into the 2015 Paris agreement : a rules-based commitiment for the post
2020 period.
COP18 (Doha 2012) started with the idea of setting some rules for the post-Kyoto period,
and resulted in a series of amendments to the original protocol. Its expiration date was
postponed from 2012 to 2020; after that year, a successor to Kyoto had to produce its
eﬀects, and the schedule for constructing such a document was set to 2015. The Doha
amendment to the Kyoto protocol restricts the trading mechanisms only to the parties that
have actually taken part in the second agreement; furthermore, it limits the possibility of
access to the emission surplus allowances eventually stored during the Kyoto period only
to countries exceeding their allowances in the 2012-2020 timeline. However, many countries
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stated their intention not to acquire further allowances, and the vast majority did not ratify
the amendment. As a result, the amendment is not currently eﬀective: to enter into force,
144 out of the 192 parties (75%) were requested to sign it, but as of 2015 it has only been
ratiﬁed by 57 nations (less than 30%).
The following COP19 (Warsaw 2013) and COP20 (Lima 2014) did not accomplish im-
portant results, but allowed negotiations among diﬀerent position to continue, clearing the
way for the Paris agreement.
4.2 Achievements in GHG emission reduction
There is not an univocal, shared answer to the question over the eﬀectiveness of the Kyoto
protocol. A study by Kumazawa et al. (2012) showed that emission reductions diﬀerred
greatly among developed countries that were bound to reduce their GHG emissions, with the
result of 38 industrialised country that were not able to fulﬁll their obligations by the end of
the ﬁrst Kyoto period. At the same time, others (Grunewald et al. 2011) demonstrated
a clear CO2 emissions' decrease trend for the period 1960-2009 that can be brought back to
the protocol. The UNFCCC itself (2012), in analysing the period from 1990 to 2010, has
aﬃrmed that the total GHG emissions of Annex I Parties experienced a reduction of 8.9%,
well beyond the 2012 original target. And it is a fact that 21 countries (mostly European
ones) achieved to meet their reduction targets.
However, even these results are disputed, based on the ways on which the original esteems
were made, or upon the fact that the most of the virtuous nations were not among the
main polluters. Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Romania -for example- are the countries
that reached the highest levels of CO2 reduction, with an extraordinary mean positive gap
bewteen their percentage target and their actual percentage change of 81.313; nevertheless, if
combined together, they still account for less than 1% of the world's share of GHG emissions.
4.2.1 Current situation on GHG emissions
The most recent available data are the ones elaborated by the Climate Action Tracker (CAT),
an independent scientiﬁc analysis that reunites the results of four diﬀerent climate research
organisations14 and which has monitored since 2009 GHG emissions of 31 countries. The
13UNFCCC data, LULUCF included.
14Ecofys, Climate analytics, Potsdam Institute for climate impact research (PIK), NewClimate Institute.
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sample is composed of the principal, biggest polluters1516 and a representation of smaller
emitters too, covering about 81.3% of greenhouse gases global emissions and approximately
70% of the world inhabitants. Nations belonging to the sample are evaluated on the basis
of their GHG emission reduction eﬀorts, considering if their INDCs17, pledges and current
policies are likely to maintain global warming below the 2°C cap, based on their esteemed
individual contribution to climate change:
Rating List of country by category (alphabetical order)
Suﬃcient Bhutan, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Morocco, Gambia
Medium
Brazil, China, EU, India, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Norway, Peru,
Philippines, Switzerland, USA
Inadequate
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Indonesia, Japan, New
Zealand, Russian federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South
Africa, South Korea Turkey, UAE, Ukraine
Table 4.3: List of countries' rating based on their current polluting behavior
In 2015, only 5 out of 31 countries had a suﬃcient behavior, indicating a full consistency
with below the 2°C limit. Eleven countries' eﬀorts were judged medium, meaning that their
current level of GHG emissions is likely to slightly exceed the threshold, while the majority
(15) behaved inadequate(ly): if all nations followed their conduct, we would experience a
3-4°C temperature rise, widely above the safety cap. According to the CAT, no country
has adopted a role model conduct yet, one that would bring the expected increase below 2°C.
4.3 COP21 and the Paris agreement
The 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 21) took place from November
30 to December 12 in Paris, France. The conference started in a climate of both protests and
great expectations, announcing its ambitous target of producing a legally-binding, commonly
shared agreeement on climate involving the highest possible number of countries. After many
15The European Union is considered as one due to its integrated carbon trading scheme (EU ETS).
16Data and ratings exclude LULUCF, i.e. emissions from land use, land use change and forestry.
17Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, commitments to reduce GHG emissions submitted to the
UNFCCC.
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sleepless nights and being one day late with respect to the original schedule, the delegations
working on the drafts ﬁnally reached their aim and presented a document which is expected
to start its eﬀects in 2020. For the very ﬁrst time in history, an universal agreement on
climate change was reached and welcomed by consensus by all the 195 countries attending
COP21.
4.3.1 The agreement
The ﬁnal draft of the agreement is a 32-pages document that can be divided into two parts.
The ﬁrst one is a list of 140 actions that are or will be executed by the Conference of the
Parties, while the second one (the Annex ) includes the 29 articles that truly constitute the
treaty itself. Through these parts, two ambitious and equally important long term objectives
are set.
The ﬁrst one has 2100 as a target, and its purpose is to keep below the discussed 2°C
threshold the inevitable rise in temperature the world will experience by 2100 as a con-
sequence of GHG emissions, with a parallel attempt to further narrow such increase below
the 1.5°C limit. This was introduced for the ﬁrst time in an oﬃcial UNFCCC document
as a possible objective, being identiﬁed as the most desirable -and therefore still feasible-
cap in order to prevent the worst global warming-related eﬀects and especially protect the
Caribbean and Paciﬁc Island states. By 2018 the IPCC is requested to provide a special
report on the impacts of climate change associated with the compliance of such a target.
From now on, and diﬀerently from what was written in the Copenhagen accord (2009), 2°C
must be intended as the ultimate, maximum measure, rather than some kind of objective.
The second aim, even more demanding, states the need to reach in the second half of
this century a global net zero CO2 emissions point (art. 4.1). It is the so-called carbon
neutrality, which is not to be intended as the moment in which GHG-emitting technologies
will not be used anymore, but as the situation in which the production of such anthropogenic
pollutants will equal the quantity of CO2 that is naturally absorbed by the environment
itself. This will be accomplished by gradually reducing the use of fossil fuels, and it is worth
noticing that it is the ﬁrst international climate agreement to request such thing.
How to achieve Paris emission targets
Five areas are identiﬁed as crucial by the agreement in order to determine the course of action
to be taken:
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 mitigation -the most important eﬀort, the one concerned with the actual GHG emis-
sion reduction;
 adaptation -meaning that countries will strenghten their ways to deal with future
climate impacts, which are foreseen as inevitable even with the reach of the 1.5°C
target;
 loss and damage -along with the previous area, is the enhancement of actions for
nations to recover from climate impacts;
 support - a series of ﬁnancial aids necessary to fulﬁll the agreement's purpose, with a
particular focus on less-developed countries;
 transparency system and global stock-take -the latter starting in 2023 with the
purpose of assessing the results achieved, and to be repeated every ﬁve years.
By the end of COP21, 188 countries out of 196 had produced their climate pledges (INDCs)
to implement GHG emission reduction for the terms 2025-2030; the UNFCCC published on
November 1, 2015 a study evaluating the actions plans that were ready at that time. It showed
that, despite the great eﬀorts demonstrated by the parties, the increase in temperature would
still be between 2.7°C and 3°C above the settled cap (instead of the 4-5°C resulting from a
business as usual scenario), even with the full accomplishment of such contributions. Under
these results, the Paris Agreement forces its parties to review their pledges on a regular basis
(art. 14.2): every ﬁve years, starting from 2020, with the explicit prescription for them to be
at least as ambitious as the previous ones. This means that the 188 parties of the UNFCCC
will not be able to reduce their stated eﬀorts, which now constitute the basis for further,
improved and higher emission reductions.
Countries are therefore encouraged to constantly review their contributions and to strenghten
their objectives; a country that wants to adjust its pledge by making it stronger can submit
its INDC at any time, without expecting the next ﬁve-years phase.
The last point of the list refers to the implementation of a process tracking progresses
achieved in GHG emission reduction. This will work both at a national level, monitoring
the eﬀectiveness of each national contribution, and at global level, verifying the step-by-step
compliance with the long term objectives. It has been proved that the previous accounting
methods, based on a bottom-up pathway, were in fact insuﬃcient and ineﬀective in order to
reach the global goal.
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Therefore, starting from 2018, a global stock-take will regularly monitor each nation's
progresses towards that direction; a compliance mechanism will be overseen by a committee
of experts, operating in a non-punitive way.
Finally, in the period between now and 2020 (the year when the agreement should enter
into force) countries will be required to further implement their current actions towards
mitigation and adaptation, and to deﬁne the ways through which the required ﬁnancial aids
will be gathered. These ﬁve years should constitute a solid foundation for the second period.
Hopes for an international market
One of the main defeats of the Kyoto protocol was its inability to create an international
market for carbon emission allowances. More accurately, it did achieve the creation of such
markets -as we have previously mentioned- but only at a restricted, national level, with the
only exception of the EU emission trading scheme, involving 31 sovereign entities. Part of
article 6 of the Paris agreement is dedicated to the possibility of the future development of
market-based approaches for mitigation:
[since] some Parties choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the implemen-
tation of their nationally determined contributions [...], the use of internationally
transferred mitigation outcomes18 to achieve [them] shall be voluntary and au-
thorized.
In the end, and diﬀerently from what was prescribed in the Kyoto protocol, the possible
future system of tradable ITMOs would have as objective
the aim to deliver an overall mitigation in global emissions (art. 6.4, d)
resulting therefore in an actual net-mitigation impact, and no longer in some kind of
purely compensating mechanism.
4.3.2 The role of the parties
The COP21 agreement will become legally-binding only if ratiﬁed by at least 55 countries,
representing 55% of the whole GHG emissions in the year between April 22, 2016 and April
21, 2017.
18ITMOs is the new terminology used by the agreement to indicate allowances.
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With regards to its future parties, a clear diﬀerence between wealthier and less-developed
nations is once again remarked. The ﬁrst ones are still identiﬁed as the main players in the
ﬁght against climate change, while the latter are depicted as the ones needing support for
mitigation and adaptation to global warming related eﬀects (in the short term) and fundings
in order to achieve a cleaner development (art. 9).
Concrete numbers, ways to achieve them or schedules are not included in the legally-
binding part of the treaty, but in its ﬁrst part is mentioned the need to raise by 2020 US$100
billion a year by means of loans and donations. These funds will be used for the ﬁnance-
ment of adaptation projects and for the transition towards a low GHG emissions future, and
collected among industrialised countries that will be obliged in this task after the ratiﬁca-
tion of the document. Voluntary contributions from developing countries are expected -and
encouraged- as well, since their large, emerging economies have modiﬁed their importance on
the international stage with respect to the one they had in the very ﬁrst COPs. The amount
is speciﬁcally said to be increased: before 2025 a new collective fund, surpassing the previous
one, will be deﬁned.
Moreover, mechanisms to allow for a greater degree of ﬁnancial transparency are provided
within the agreement: the global stock-take will also include a review of the contributions
provided by the parties. Developed countries will be required to report, on a two years basis,
on their projected public climate ﬁnance as well as on the supporting measures that they
have already granted. In the next COPs, more detailed accounting rules will be established.
Parties of the agreement are not the only ones from whom a course of action is expected:
civil society, the private sector, ﬁnancial institutions, cities and in general subnational au-
thorities are recognised as stakeholders in the ﬁrst part of the agreement, and encouraged
and welcomed in their eﬀorts against global warming. A massive contributions will come
from these actors as well, under the approval of the COP21; their eﬀorts have now entered
the United Nations Non-state Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) portal, and include
the following parties:
 over 7,000 cities from over 100 industrialised and less-developed nations, accounting for
a population of 1.25 billion people and for around a third of the global GDP;
 sub-national states and regions occupying 1/5 of total global land area;
 over 5,000 companies, whose combined revenues surpass US$38 trillion;
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 nearly 500 investors, managing assets with a value over US$25 trillion.
It is hoped that pledges and ambitions formulated by business and subnational actors will
eventually increase the determination of their own sovranational governments to strenghten
their own ones. All these civil parties are explicitly encouraged in the preamble of the
agreement to continue their work of indirect persuasion.
4.3.3 A truly legally-binding agreement?
We have introduced the Paris agreement deﬁning it as the ﬁrst universal, legally-binding
agreement on climate change. However, we have also mentioned the inexistence of a clear
sanctionary mechanisms to protect the treaty against non-compliance. How much legal force
has been provided to the document? Negotiations on the ﬁnal draft have resulted in a sort
of hybrid form for the agreement, with some of its elements being legally-binding, while
others, equally important, are not. To quote an example, the two long term objectives and
the national reporting requirements are explicitly prescribed as legally-binding, while the
national mitigation targets (INDCs) required for the post-2020 period are not (art. 3).
The reason behind this combination of forms may be seen in the fact that in order
to constitute an as-large-as-possible basis for the agreement, some compromises have been
necessary. These arrangements exposed the document itself to criticisms, the main ones
underlining its lack of a sanctionary system, as well as the fact that countries will have an
option to choose whether to ratify it or not, therefore adhering to its legally-binding nature
on a voluntary basis. During the negotiations, there has been a clear trade-oﬀ between the
redaction of an universal, commonly shared agreement and the production of a stricter, more
demanding treaty.
The ﬁrst philosophy has clearly prevailed. Nevertheless, the nature of the agreement is
the one of an international treaty, giving it a strongly enough framework to produce the
desired eﬀects.

Part II
A game theory approach
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Chapter 5
Fundamentals of game theory
The purpose of this chapter is to provide with the main tools that will be necessary to address
the optimal control problem we provide in the ﬁnal Chapter 6. To do so, we begin with a
brief introduction about what game theory is, starting from its deﬁnition and its very ﬁrst
assumptions. Then, among all the variety of types games can assume, we select the most
helpful to our case, underlining the importance of the players' choices while distinguishing
between cooperative and non-cooperative games, and analysing in which forms games may
be depicted. We also introduce the ideas of best response and dominant strategy, and the
less strong, yet more ﬁtting to reality, concept of Nash Equilibrium. We mention some of the
main criticisms that have arised about game theory, along with the responses to them.
After that, we focus on the time issue, talking about dynamic games and how to solve
them using backward induction. From there we move to diﬀerential games, a peculiar type of
dynamic games, explaining what they are and upon which informations a player determines
his strategy: this leads us the the concepts of open-loop and Markovian strategies, that are
particularly used in games regarding environmental issues.
Finally, we introduce optimal control problems along with the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation and the Pontryagin Maximum Principle, two methodologies that are used in order
to determine a solution. f
5.1 An introduction to game theory
The Encyclopædia Britannica deﬁnes the game theory as follows:
the analysis of a situation involving conﬂicting interests in terms of gain and
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losses among opposing players.
This is of course a highly broad statement, that shows how game theory can be applied to
a multitude of ﬁelds, from sociology to politics, from military strategy to philosophy, just to
mention fews: all scenarios where people have to interact and make some decisions. Since we
are dealing with an economic topic, we have to limit our focus by including some parameters
and characteristics that allow us to apply mathematical models to these interactions.
A more punctual deﬁnition for our purposes may be the following one:
Game theory is the study of mathematical models of conﬂict and cooperation
between intelligent rational decision-makers (Myerson 1997, p. 1).
The second part of the deﬁnition introduces some simplyfying assumptions, which are con-
sidered necessary in order to build some models depicting the complexity of the real world.
In the classic trade-oﬀ between solvability and realism, the most common axioms are two:
1. rationality;
2. strategic thinking.
We deﬁne a rational player as one who is able to order his own preferences regarding a
number of possible outcomes; these preferences have to satisfy some axioms, depicted by Von
Neumann and Morgenstern in 19471. Players will choose among the actions at their disposal
in order to maximise their utility function2, which can be an expression of any quantitative
measure. Furthermore, a rational player will know the number of his opponents and the
set of all possible strategies, and will be able to develop expectations about any uncertainty
about the game. A player will think strategically if:
when designing his strategy for playing the game, [he] takes into account
any knowledge or expectation he may have regarding his opponent's behavior
(Dockner et al. 2000, p. 11-12).
There are four basic elements that can be found in any game: (two or more) players, set
of strategies available, outcomes and payoﬀs. These elements are also known as the rules
of the game, because they constitute its formal description; for this reason, they are not
ﬁxed criteria, but change constantly from case to case and are derived from the institutional
1The four axioms of rationality are completeness, transitivity, continuity and independence.
2Measure of preference over some set of goods and services.
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environment in which the game is set. It is easy to notice that, since the involved players are
always at least two, their ﬁnal payoﬀs do not depend only on their own choices: in choosing
which strategy among those at their disposal is the best one, they will have to consider also
the ones that the other(s) player(s) may implement. To be fully deﬁned, a game must also
specify which are the informations and the actions available to each of the participants.
There is a multitude of cases that might be studied, starting from these very few charac-
teristics common to all games: games where players move simultaneously, others where there
is a clear sequence for the actions; situations in which there is perfect information, others in
which there is not; games that are to be played once, others that will repeat themselves, just
to mention the most common ones.
5.1.1 Cooperative and non-cooperative games
A further, peculiar distinction is the one between cooperative and non-cooperative games.
Non-cooperative games represent all the situations in which players do not cooperate with
each other, do not make binding agreements (or are not forced to do so), and are just rivals
who choose actions on behalf of their own interest. These kinds of situation are of course
characterised by a high degree of uncertainty, since every single player can not know what
strategy the others will follow. On the other hand, a game is cooperative if the players
involved are able to gather themselves into groups, and to coordinate their actions in order
to maximise their mutual, expected outcomes. The ability (or will) to make binding agree-
ments largely depends on the institutional environment in which the game takes place. The
main focus here is not anymore to decide which action is the best for each player to take,
considered the presence of some rivals, but how share the expected earning between all the
members of the group, according to the terms of the agreement.
Game theory shows us that to cooperate is always a good decision: the expected outcomes
are higher in these games, with respect to the non-cooperative ones.
5.1.2 Strategic and extensive forms
The strategic and the extensive forms are the two types of models used to represent non-
cooperative games. In every strategic form we ﬁnd the following elements:
1. a set of players N = {1, . . . , N};
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2. a set of possible strategies U i for each player i ∈ N ;
3. a real-valued function J i for each player i ∈ N , such that J i(u1, . . . , un) represents
the payoﬀ of player i ∈ N if the N players use the strategies (u1, . . . , uN) ∈ U1 ×
U2 × . . .× UN .
Strategy plays a fundamental role in this game form, and it is deﬁned as a function that guides
the player in his process of choosing one of the feasible actions at his disposal whenever he
has to make a move, taking into account all the possible events that may have occurred until
that precise time of the game, known as the history of the game. A strategy guides the player
through all possible histories of the game, even those that will never be actually observed,
selecting his feasible choices of action. As we have mentioned, strategic forms are used
to depict non-cooperative games: this means that a player chooses one particular strategy
among his own list of possible ones, without any form of communication or cooperation with
his opponents, that have to choose blindly their own strategy too. It is from this lack of
knowledge that permeates non-cooperative games that rises their typical issue of uncertainty.
Strategic forms do not mention explicitly the time element: however, they can still represent
in a general way games that go beyond the one-shot option, as they are repeated over time.
A player could determine in advance, at the very beginning of the game, the course of actions
that he will implement for every possible stage of the game.
An example of a strategic form is given below, where the ﬁrst player has to decide wheter
to play A or B, while the second must choose between C and D.
1 \ 2 C D
A (2,1) (0,0)
B (-1,1) (3,2)
Table 5.1: Representation of a strategic form
For a more precise description of games played over time the extensive form is used,
in the look of a decision tree, that is particularly helpful in describing the sequence in which
players will have to move, as well as in highlighting the points in which chance events that
can change the course of the game may happen. With regard of the time element, extensive
forms are superior to strategic ones: they describe clearly the order of moves available to
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the players, which informations are revealed to them (and at what time), and how they may
inﬂuence the game. On the other hand, a tree may not be easy to be managed and depicted
when the complexity of games arise.
The game tree below shows how it is possible to represent the previous example in an
extensive form as well.
1
2
(3,2)(-1,1)
[C] [D]
2
(0,0)(2,1)
[C] [D]
[A] [B]
Figure 5.1: Representation of an extensive form
5.1.3 Best response and dominant strategy
We will start by brieﬂy analizing a non-cooperative, one shot game, where all players move
just once, in order to show that even if our randomly choosen player i is not able to predict
the moves of his opponents, he can always determine which one should be his best strategy,
given a set of possible actions for all the players. Let ui(si, s−i) be the payoﬀ (or utility)
of player i when the proﬁle of strategies s = (si, s−i) is played; here si represents i's own
strategy, while s−i stands for the strategies of all other players N − 1. We will ﬁnd the
deﬁnition of best response by considering a game with N players, where i is the generic
player whose point of view we are adopting, and −i are all the other players diﬀerent from
i; the following strategy s∗i (s−i) is a best response for player i if it guarantees to him the
highest payoﬀ when other players have played s−j
ui(s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ ui(si, s−i) ∀si ∈ Si
where Si denotes the set of player i's strategies.
A (strict) dominant strategy s∗i represents a stronger concept, which is deﬁned as player
i's best reply for all possible strategies played by the other players
ui(s
∗
i , s−i) > ui(si, s−i)
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for all si and for all s−i. This means that the strategy proﬁle s = s1, . . . , sn is an equilibrium
in dominant strategy if si is a dominant strategy for each i = 1, . . . , n. It is important to
underline how a dominant strategy represents the best strategy a player may play, and not
the one that could give him the maximum payoﬀ available.
5.1.4 Nash Equilibrium
A strategy proﬁle is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a game if each player is playing a best
response to the other players' strategies; in other terms, the strategy proﬁle s∗ is a Nash
Equilibrium of the n-players game if, for all players i = 1, . . . , n,
ui(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i) ∀si 6= s∗i
Every player i will always prefer his s∗i strategy among all the ones at his disposal, asssuming
that all the other players play s∗j ; i will have no unilateral incentive to deviate, unless he
wants to worsen his outcome3.
A Nash Equilibrium is of course a weaker concept with respect to the one of the equilib-
rium in a dominant strategy that we have previously analysed. It can be demonstrated that
if a strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium in a dominant strategy, then it is (the unique) Nash
Equilibrium as well. The converse, however, does not hold, underlining how this strategy is
not the best a player can do in absolute terms, but only conditionally to the others' ones.
5.1.5 Some criticisms of game theory
Game theory has also gathered some criticisms, that we would like to mention brieﬂy in this
paragraph, along with the responses given by its supporters, for seek of clarity. Critics to
game theory usually belong to very diﬀerent ﬁelds.
There have been some concerns about ethics, starting from the analysis of the assumptions
that stand behind game theory. At a ﬁrst glance, it may seem defective both as a normative
theory of action and as a descriptive theory of action. As a matter of fact, if we look at the
very ﬁrst assumptions we have given, players seem to be urged to care only about their own
self-interest, while when we focus on the actual depiction of situations, the theory assumes
that players move and decide only on the basis of their own self-interest, even when they
3And this is not allowed by the rationality axiom.
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apparently do not. These concerns can be easily answered, because they are built on a
misunderstanding about the deﬁnition of payoﬀ:
A payoﬀ simply represents a person's well-ordered preferences, [which may be]
altruistic and self-sacriﬁcing. As long as a person's preferences are well-ordered,
even a perfectly altruistic saint [...] is maximising his payoﬀ (Chun 2014, p. 29).
Another class of criticisms is concerned with the assumptions behind game theory from a
technical point of view, judging them uncapable of truly depicting what may happen in the
real world. Psychology has largely demonstrated how human beings are not capable of that
full rationality which is the ﬁrst axiom of game theory; they prefer to talk about bounded
rationality, since the informations we use to understand the environment surrounding us are
always incomplete, because of our mind's inability to process all of them and of the limited
amount of time we use for the process. This seems to be the greatest weakness of game
theory, since its axioms and assumptions imagine a role for informations that is unbearable
for the human mind: are all the informations about the opponents, their strategies, one's own
possible moves always available for the player? Probably not. As we have said in the ﬁrst
paragraphs, there is a clear trade-oﬀ between the complexity of a model (that is, its closeness
to reality) and its solvability; the ideal model, as close to reality as possible, would be
too complicated to be predicted. The numbers of variables that it should have to take into
account would make it impossible to solve, and therefore useless. But having said that game
theory does not truly describe reality, this does not make it less helpful for predicting it:
We should be aware that models are not supposed to be accurate representa-
tions of real-world phenomena, but even very simpliﬁed models do not necessarily
produce useless predictions. [Game theory] is not [to be applied] in a mechanistic
way (Dockner et al. 2000, p. 12).
5.2 Dynamic games
Dynamic games are more complex and more correspondent to reality, mostly when we refer
to economics and look at ﬁrms which can make more than one decision over the game pe-
riod. The introduction of the time element is not a suﬃcient condition per se in order to
diﬀerentiate a static game from a dynamic one. Dynamic games may be deﬁned as those
where at least one player can react strategically to the actions conducted previously, using
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informations that were not available when the game started.
The ﬁrst thing to do when studying a dynamic game is to determine in which order players
move, and what informations are available to them when they have to decide their actions.
We will focus on games of perfect information, meaning that every player is aware of all the
previous actions when he makes his move at time t: his own past actions and his rivals' ones
of course, but also every exogenous event that may inﬂuence the game. All the players move
simultaneously if, at every moment t, they do not know anything about the actions that are
being played at the same time by their opponents. We are dealing however with games of
perfect information: all past actions until t− 1 are known by all the participants; this allows
us to introduce the concept of history of actions by time t (denoted by ht). It corresponds to
a sequence u1, u2, . . . , ut−1, where any action-proﬁle is a set of N individual actions of the
players. The history before the beginning of the game is represented by h0, and is an empty
set. Payoﬀs of the players can be deﬁned both as functions of the history ht, as well as sums
of per-period payoﬀs.
5.3 Diﬀerential games
Diﬀerential games are dynamic games played in continuous time, with two peculiar char-
acteristics:
1. a set of variables that characterises the state of the dynamical system at any instant of
time during the game;
2. the evolution over time of the state variables is described by a set of diﬀerential equa-
tions.
Diﬀerential games, unlike dynamic ones, are usually represented with a strategic form. To
deepen our comprehension of diﬀerential games, we start by representing the time variable
with t, and by supposing that the game will be played during a time interval [0 , T ], where
T , which is the horizon (or planning period), may be inﬁnite or ﬁnite, but always greater
than zero. The state of the game at each instant t can be described by an n-dimensional
vector x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xN(t)) ∈ X, where X ⊆ Rn is a set containing all possible
states, also known as the state space of the game; x(t) is also known as the state vector, and
is introduced in order to characterise the current state of a dynamical system. Denote by
the variable ui(t) the action taken at time t by player i, which is referred to as the control of
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player i. Furthermore, any action chosen by a player at an instant t must be derived from
the player's set of feasible actions, which generally depends on the current time t, the current
state x(t) and the set of current actions of the player's opponents.
We have seen that one of the two important features of diﬀerential games is that the
evolution over time of x(t) is determined by diﬀerential equations
x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), u1(t), . . . , uN(t))
x(0) = x0
also known as the state equations, showing that all players have the chance of inﬂuencing the
rate of change of the state vector through the choice of their current actions. Each player
tries to maximise his total payoﬀ over the planning horizon, discounted at the rate ri ≥ 0
J i =
ˆ T
0
e−ritF i(t, x(t), u1(t), . . . , uN(t)) dt
where F i deﬁnes the instantaneous payoﬀ of player i. This equation demonstrates that -in
general- every player is able to inﬂuence the payoﬀ of player i through the choice of his
current actions. The payoﬀ J i has to be maximised by player i through his choice of the
control ui(t) for every t ∈ [0, T ]. The diﬀerential game we have just deﬁned is a strategic
form game.
5.3.1 Open-loop strategies
Since we are using strategic rather than extensive forms to model a diﬀerential game, an
issue arises: we need to specify upon which information a player conditions his strategy. The
choice here is between a strategy space or an information structure, and the answer comes
directly from the institutional environment that frames the game. For example, a player may
decide to use a minimum of information and base his strategies only on time, while another
may base his strategies on the whole history of actions. These are, of course, two extreme
cases: the ﬁrst one brings us to the concept of open-loop strategy, which is conditioned
only on current time, meaning that we will have a strategy conditioned on a minimal amount
of information. During the game an action is chosen instead of another one only on the basis
of the moment in which the move has to be done. By doing so, players leave all informations
(except time) out of consideration, either by choice or because they can only observe their
own actions (and time, of course). In games regarding renewable resources and environmental
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issues, a player using an open-loop strategy cares about the conservation of resources and
the preservation of the environment.
5.3.2 Markovian strategies
In a Markovian strategy a player is conditioned on current time t and on the state vector
x(t) when he has to decide which action is to be chosen. Unlike open-loop strategies, here
players' choices are not driven by the game history until time t: only the consequences of
the previous moves matter, and they are represented in the current value of the state vector,
an eﬀect of the so-called Markov property of memorylessness. Markovian strategies have
the important feature of being simple: it can be demonstrated (Maskin et al. 2001) that
players use them in a learning context, in which it is expensive -and therefore not convenient-
to increase the complexity of a strategy.
In a game that is played through the use of Markovian strategies, a Nash equilibrium is
called Markovian Nash equilibrium, or feedback (closed-loop) Nash equilibrium. The result-
ing equilibrium is perfect in all the subgames of the game, a concept that is developed in the
next subsection.
5.3.3 Backward induction and subgame perfectness
As we have already mentioned, the use of the extensive form is much more usfeul for the
analysis of dynamic games with respect to the strategic one; moreover, the principle of
backward induction is particularly helpful. It is used to solve games with a ﬁnite number
of time periods T < ∞ and with a ﬁnite number of strategy sets. The game is solved by
ﬁrst determining the optimal choice in the ﬁnal moment t and then, working backward, the
optimal choice for the previous instant t− 1, and so on until the starting point is reached.
Backward induction has a natural extension in the property of subgame perfectness,
an important concept of dynamic game theory. A subgame may be considered as a subset
of any games that includes an initial node -that must be independent from any information
set- and all its successor nodes. It is basically a game on its own, a cut version of the whole
picture; it may start at time t after a particular history of actions ht, and we represent it with
the symbol Γ(ht). A Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle for the game as a whole (σ) induces a
strategy proﬁle in the subgame Γ(ht), which is the restriction of σ to the subgame Γ(ht). A
Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle σ for the whole game is subgame perfect if, for any history
ht, it holds that the restriction of σ to the subgame Γ(ht) is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(ht). It
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is worth noticing that subgame perfectness requires not only that σ is a Nash equilibrium
for the whole game, but also that σ's restrictions are Nash equilibria for every subgame: this
means that the Nash equilibrium must exist also in the subgames that are not played.
Subgame perfectness is by deﬁnition a stronger equilibrium concept than Nash equilib-
rium.
5.4 Optimal control problems
We have seen that diﬀerential games are situations in which players want to maximise their
objective functional subject to some constraints, the most important of which is a diﬀerential
equation describing the evolution of the state of the game. The concept of Nash equilibrium in
such a dynamic situation involving n players is related to the resolution of n optimal control
problems, one for each player, where the opponents' strategies are considered as parameters.
We are then facing an optimisation problem, and the following concepts belongint to optimal
control theory must be taken into account in order to determine the Nash equilibria.
From Section 5.3, we recall that the diﬀerential game spreads over the period [0, T ]
with T > 0, and that every player can make a move at every time t ∈ T , inﬂuencing both
the evolution of the state of the game and his own and his opponents' objective functionals.
We have also introduced the state vector x(t) and we have underlined how the evolution of
the state can be described by the following diﬀerential equation (which has a speciﬁc focus
on a single, particular player)
x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t), t) (5.1)
which is a description of how he current state x(t) and the player's actions at time t inﬂuence
the rate of change of the state at time t. It has to satisfy the intial condition
x(0) = x0 ∈ X (5.2)
with X being the state space of the game. In the equation (5.1) u(t) is the abbreviation for
u(t) = (u1(t), u2(t), . . . , um(t)) ∈ Rm, and represents the vector of actions chosen by our
selected player at time t. This allows us to introduce the ﬁrst constraint that must be obeyed
u(t) ∈ U(x(t), t) (5.3)
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where U(x, t) ⊆ Rm represents the set of all feasible actions at time t, if the state of the
system is equal to x. These three equations ([5.1], [5.2] and [5.3]) are the constraints of the
optimal control problem.
The next step is to introduce the objective functional of our player
J(u(·)) =
ˆ T
0
e−rtF (x(t), u(t), t) dt+ e−rTS(x(T )) (5.4)
recalling that r ≥ 0 stands for the discount rate. Furthermore, F (x(t), u(t), t) -the utility
function- tells us the player's utility when he chooses the control function u(t) at time t,
with the current state of the game being x(t), while S(x(T )) -the terminal value function-
represents the terminal value associated with the state x(T ).
A standard optimal control problem consists of maximising the functional J deﬁned in
(5.4) over all control paths u(·) which satisfy (5.3), while taking into account that the evolu-
tion of the state is determined by the system dynamics (5.1) and the initial condition (5.2).
We have just mentioned the concept of control path, whose introduction also brings some
problems that have to be addressed in order to continue: solutions to (5.1) and (5.2) may not
exist or may not be unique, and the integral in (5.4) may not be deﬁned. To deal with this
problems, we have to restrict the set of control paths u(·) in a way that makes the objective
functional J(u(·)) well deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 5.1 A control path u : [0, T ] 7→ Rm is feasible for the optimal control problem
we are considering if the initial value problem (5.1) - (5.2) has a unique absolutely continuous
solution x(·) such that the constraints x(t) ∈ X and u(t) ∈ U(x(t), t) hold for all t and the
integral in (5.4) is well deﬁned. The control path u(·) is optimal if it is feasible and if the
inequality J(u(·)) > J(u˜(·)) holds for all possible control paths u˜(·).
5.4.1 The Hamilton - Jacobi - Bellman equation
We have seen that Markovian strategies may deal with continuous time situations, meaning
that a player can decide at any time which decision is to be implemented. Under these
assumptions, with the state space and the action space being continuous, a possible approach
to the solution of an optimal control problem is the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (from now
on: HJB) equation.
Through the HJB equation it is possible to ﬁnd the optimal criterion: when it is solved
over the whole state space, it represents a necessary and suﬃcient condition for an optimum.
It is based on two important principles: embedding and recursion. At a ﬁrst glance, the ﬁrst
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one does not seem very helpful, since it widens exceedingly our ﬁeld of study: starting from
our problem P (x0, 0) which begins at time t = 0 in the initial state x0, the principle prescribes
not to solve only it, but rather the entire family of problems {P (x, t) |x ∈ X, t ∈ [0, T ]}
in which our ﬁrst one is embedded. The new problem P (x, t) begins at time t in the initial
state x and can be stated as follows
Maximise
ˆ T
t
e−r(s−t)F (x(s), u(s), s) ds+ e−r(T−t)S(x(T )) (5.5)
subject to
x(s˙) = f(x(s), u(s), s)
x(t) = x
u(s) ∈ U(x(s), s)
It seems that we now have to solve inﬁnitely many problems instead of one, but here is
where the second principle comes in handy and justiﬁes the validity of the HJB equation.
Recursion means that we have to start by picking the smallest problems of the entire
family -P (x, T ), x ∈ X- and work our way backwards to the largest ones, which are
P (x, 0), x ∈ X. Knowing the solution of all small problems will help to ﬁnd the solution of
any larger one.
We will start by denoting the only feasible (and hence the optimal) value of the objective
functional of P (x, T ) by V (x, T ), which will also denote the optimal value of the objective
functional of the problem expressed in (5.5). The optimal value function V satisﬁes the
following equation
rV (x, t)− Vt(x, t) = max{F (x, u, t) + Vx(x, t)f(x, u, t) |u ∈ U(x, t)}
which is the HJB equation. Is V always diﬀerentiable? The answer is no, and that is the
reason why no theorem exists stating that the optimal value function V is continuously
diﬀerentiable and solves the HJB equation. A solution to this issue may be to consider
the HJB equation only as a suﬃcient optimality condition, under the assumption that the
optimal value function is continuously diﬀerentiable. This would lead us to the formulation
of the following theorem.
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Theorem 5.1 Let V : X × [0, T ] 7→ R be a continuously diﬀerentiable function which
satisﬁes the HJB equation
rV (x, t)− Vt(x, t) = max{F (x, u, t) + Vx(x, t)f(x, u, t) |u ∈ U(x, t)} (5.6)
and the terminal condition
V (x, T ) = S(x) (5.7)
for all (x, t) ∈ X× [0, T ]. Let Φ(x, t) denote the set of controls u ∈ U(x, t) maximising the
right-hand side of (5.6). If u(·) is a feasible control path with corresponding state trajectory
x(·) and if u(t) ∈ Φ(x(t), t) holds for almost all t ∈ [0, T ] then u(·) is an optimal control
path. Moreover, V (x, t) is the optimal value of problem P (x, t).
The study of perfect Nash equilibria in subgames is based on the HJB equation system:
once the solution of the system has been determined, the optimal conditions provide the
optimal strategies, at least in an implicit form.
5.4.2 Pontryagin Maximum Principle
Along with the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman, another methodology used to approach optimal
control problems is the Pontryagin Maximum Principle. Its importance is given by the
fact that it leads to the formulation of necessary conditions, diﬀerently from what happen with
the HJB theory that provides suﬃcient conditions. These necessary conditions -which, by
being such, must be satisﬁed- allow to determine quite easily a solution which is a candidate
for optimality. However, a solution satisfying all the necessary conditions is not automatically
the optimal one, otherwise those conditions would be suﬃcient too.
Furthermore, it is useful since there are often dynamic optimisation problems where,
because of the extent of the time lapse upon which the system is considered, the utility ﬂows
are valued within the objective functional, taking their distribution over time into account
(Viscolani 2003). This can be obtained by multiplying the function representing the utility
ﬂow by an actualisation function which must be continuous, decreasing and with values in
]0, 1]. Such an actualisation function is embodied by e−δt, with δ > 0 being a ﬁxed parameter.
Let us consider the following problem
Maximise J(u) =
ˆ t1
t0
e−δtf 0(x(t), u(t), t) dt+ S(x(t1)) (5.8)
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subject to
x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t), t)
x(t0) = x
0
xi(t1) = x
1
i i = 1, ... , l
xi(t1) ≥ x1i i = l + 1, ... , m
xi(t1) ∈ R
u(t) ∈ Ω ⊆ Rr
with δ > 0.
The integrand in the objective functional is the product between the actualisation function
e−δt and the function f 0(x(t), u(t), t)
f0(x(t), u(t), t) = e
−δtf 0(x(t), u(t), t)
Hence, we deﬁne Hc as the current value Hamiltonian function
Hc(x, u, q, t) = p0f
0(x, u, t) +
n∑
i=1
qifi(x, u, t)
Theorem 5.2 Let u∗(t) be a piecewise continuous optimal control, deﬁned by [t0, t1], to
which the state function x∗(t) is associated. Then, some constants p0, η1, η2, ... , ηn ∈ R
and a piecewise continuous function of class C1 q(t) (q : [t0, t1] 7→ Rn) exist, such that, for
every t ∈ [t0, t1], the following conditions hold:
1. (p0, η) 6= 0 ∈ Rn+1 (η = (η1, η2, ... , ηn));
2. u∗(t) maximises Hc(x∗(t), u, q(t), t) for u ∈ Ω;
3. except for all the t such that u∗(t) is discontinuous,
q˙(t) = −∂H
c(x∗(t), u∗(t), q(t), t)
∂x
+ δq(t)
4. p0 ∈ {0, 1};
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5. qi(t1) = p0e
δt1 ∂S(x(t1))
∂xi
+ ηi, i = 1, ... , n
ηi ∈ R i = 1, ... , l
ηi ≥ 0 and ηi(xi(t1)− x1i ) = 0 i = l + 1, ... , m
ηi = 0 i = m+ 1, ... , n
Arrow's theorem
It should be highlighted that the Pontryagin Maximum Principle gives the necessary con-
ditions for the optimality. If the principle suggests a certain number of possible solutions,
we know that there are no other solutions capable of solving the problem. However, the
principle is not able to determine if the solution it has found is an optimal one, and neither
if an optimal solution exists. Therefore, some stronger conditions for the concavity of the
function are introduced, such that we obtain suﬃcient conditions for the optimality.
Arrow proposed the following theorem, which represents an alternative condition, yet
weaker than the Hamiltonian functions' concavity.
Theorem 5.3 Let (x∗(t), u∗(t)) be an admissible pair. If a piecewise continuous function
of class C1 p(t) (p : [t0, t1] 7→ Rn) exists, such that the following conditions (with p0 = 1)
are satisﬁed:
1. p˙(t) = −∂H∗/∂x, i = 1, ... , n;
2. H(x∗(t), u, p(t), t) ≤ H(x∗(t), u∗(t), p(t), t) ∀u ∈ Ω, ∀t ∈ [t0, t1]
3.
pi(t1) no condition i = 1, ... , l
pi(t1) ≥ 0 pi(t1)(x∗i (t1)− x1i ) = 0, i = l + 1, ... , m
pi(t1) = 0, i = m+ 1, ... , n
4. function Hˆ(x, p(t), t) = maxu∈ΩH(x, u, p(t), t)
then (x∗(t), u∗(t)) is the optimal solution for the problem.
Chapter 6
A model for environmental treaties
Once explained the economic basis of environmental treaties, given evidence of their need
for the ﬁght against climate change to succeed and having underlined the serious possible
consequences that we are going to face if a commonly shared, global answer will not be soon
determined, having summarised the most important steps taken from 1992 to the present date
by the international community, and having explained the basis on which optimal control
problems are built up, we now describe how international environmental treaties work under
the form of mathematical models.
Let us ﬁrst introduce some simplifying assumptions.
To quote the main one, we do not deal with 192 countries, as happened for the Kyoto
protocol, or with the 195 states which expressed their consensus for the Paris agreement.
Even if it is plausible that during the negotiation phases almost each one of these parties had
its own position about environmental themes, with serious degrees of diﬀerences with the
ones hold by the other players, we consider only two states, or, more precisely, two blocks
of nations. To each one of them a diﬀerent position on climate change, as well as a diﬀerent
bargaining power (as it is underlined in Section 6.2), can be associated.
The model takes inspiration from the one created by Kaitala and Pohjola (1995).
They proposed a diﬀerential game with an inﬁnite horizon where two blocks of countries,
suﬀering in diﬀerent ways from the environmental damages caused by global warming, ﬁnd
themselves willing to negotiate a commonly shared solution.
In the ﬁrst section of the chapter we report the model they have built for the scenario
characterised by non-cooperation. From that basis, we analyse a slightly diﬀerent situation,
characterised by a ﬁnite horizon, with a starting and an ending point, just like environmental
treaties consider.
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The last part is dedicated to the evaluation of the diﬀerent bargaining powers associated
with nations: who determines the most responsible countries, i.e. the ones that will face the
highest costs in order to abate GHG emissions? We consider a situation in which such power
is attributed to an hypotetical, independent regulator, and then the case in which nations
themselves are responsible for the diﬀerent distribution of responsibilities.
6.1 The non-cooperative scenario
Let us denote the two blocks of nations I1 and I2 respectively. They both share a common
good -the atmosphere- which is at risk because of greenhouse gases emissions.
In order to formulate the model, we need to determine who the two players are. Accord-
ing to Kaitala and Pohjola (1995), the division may represent the distinction between
countries suﬀering more or less from climate change. As a matter of fact, we recall from
Chapter 3 that even if global warming is aﬀecting the humanity as a whole, some countries
are more likely to experience its negative eﬀects sooner. However, we have chosen to adopt
another valid criterion, and to distinguish world countries between developing and indus-
trialised economies. Recalling what we have analysed in Chapter 4, that is that Annex II
Parties are identiﬁed as the responsible of the actual pollution levels, we expect the ﬁrst
ones to be more protected by the treaty than the already developed, second ones. In fact,
this is what happened in all the environmental treaties signed in the last decades. In the
next section we specify how the diﬀerent bargaining powers associated with the blocks may
inﬂuence the cooperative outcome.
Let Q(t) be the deviation at time t from the CO2 emission levels with respect to the base
year, and ei(t), i = 1, 2 the GHG emission level produced by each block at time t. Two
diﬀerent costs are taken into account, the ones due to the emission levels represented by
Ci(ei(t)) and also known as emission abatement costs, and the ones dependent on the CO2
concentration levels in the atmosphere denoted by Di(Q(t)) and also known as damage costs.
In the next section we introduce the ﬁnite time element, since a cooperative solution
under the cap of an international environmental treaty will take place. However, in the non-
cooperative example both I1 and I2 are not willing to come to an agreement, and therefore
we take into account the inﬁnite horizon where no joint commitment will ever take place.
The problem that the two players are facing is to determine their respective emission levels
ei(t) in a way that the cost associated to their chosen level (and therefore the consequences
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coming from GHG concentration levels in the atmosphere) is as small as possible.
Furthermore, we suppose that the evolution of Q(t) is represented by the following equa-
tion
∂Q
∂t
= σ (e1(t) + e2(t))− βQ(t) (6.1)
where σ and β are two positive environmental parameters. The ﬁrst one implies the role
played by the environment itself in absorbing (part) of all CO2 emissions, since
[it has been] estimated that a half of the anthropogenic carbon is removed by
the natural sinks, oceans mainly, while the other half remains in the atmosphere
(Nordhaus 1991, p. 78).
The second one, β, takes into account the life time of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere,
before their decay. We assume that the moment at which we observe t = 0 corresponds to the
year 1990 both for the non-cooperative and for the cooperative situations. In the next section,
the levels of GHG emissions associated with 1990 are the basis for the environmental treaty,
as it happened for the Kyoto protocol and the Paris agreement, since they are associated
with the known thresholds of 1.5-2°C.
Therefore in 1990 Q(0) = 0.
The problem that the two players are facing when deciding to pursue a non-cooperative
solution for the issue implies the determination of the emission level minimising at every time
the actual value of costs during the period [0, ∞). Or -in other terms- they must ﬁnd the
values of ei(t) for i = 1, 2 responsible of
Minimise
ˆ ∞
0
e−ρit[Ci(ei(t)) +Di(Q(t))] dt (6.2)
subject to
∂Q
∂t
= σ(e1(t) + e2(t))− βQ(t) (6.3)
Q(0) = 0 (6.4)
for all t∈ [0, ∞), i = 1, 2 and for all Q(t); ρi once again represents the discount rate for each
player i; from now on, we suppose that both of them share the same value (ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ).
Moreover, we suppose that Ci, i = 1, 2 is a decreasing convex function, and that on the
contrary Di, i = 1, 2 is an increasing convex one.
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To proceed, assume that the cost functions of the two players are both quadratic and
equal such that
Ci(ei) =
1
2
ci(ei − emi )2 (6.5)
Di(Q) =
1
2
di(Q)
2 (6.6)
where ci and di (i = 1, 2) are two positive constants and e
m
i represents the CO2 emission
rate with no reductions carried out.
Through the application of the Hamilton - Jacobi conditions it can be shown that the
non-cooperative CO2 emission policies are given as
e∗i = −
σ∗i
ci
Q+ (emi −
σ
ci
γ∗i ), i = 1, 2 (6.7)
where the coeﬃcients ∗i and γ
∗
i represent
∗i =
−
(
ρ+ 2β + 2
σ2∗j
cj
)
±
√(
ρ+ 2β + 2
σ2∗j
cj
)2
− 4σ2
ci
(−di)
2σ
2
ci
(6.8)
and
γ∗i =
∗iσ
(
emi + e
m
j − σcj γ∗j
)
ρ+ β +
∗i σ2
ci
+
∗jσ2
cj
(6.9)
Therefore, the value of non-cooperation for each player is
V ∗i (Q) =
1
2
∗iQ
2 + γ∗iQ+ µ
∗
i (6.10)
with coeﬃcient µ∗i given by
µ∗i =
(
−1
2
σ2(γ∗i )
2
ci
+ γ∗i σ
(
emi + e
m
j −
σ
cj
γ∗j
))
/ρ (6.11)
Furthermore, the diﬀerential equation for the non-cooperative Q∗ becomes
∂Q∗
∂t
= −A∗Q∗ +B∗ (6.12)
CHAPTER 6. A MODEL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES 90
where
A∗ = σ2
(
1
c1
+
2
c2
)
+ β (6.13)
and
B∗ = σ
(
em1 −
σ
c1
γ1 + e
m
2 −
σ
c2
γ2
)
(6.14)
The solution to (6.12) is given by
Q∗(t) = Q∗(0)e−A
∗t +
B∗
A∗
(1− e−A∗t) (6.15)
Thus the state trajectory converges to the value
lim
t→∞
Q∗(t) = Q¯∗ =
B∗
A∗
(6.16)
The solution to the non-cooperative situation is largely insipred by the already mentioned
work of Kaitala and Pohjola (1995). However, we have also introduced some diﬀerences
with respect to it. The main one concerns the determination of the role of the two players.
As a matter of fact, the authors divided the world countries into two groups, with the ﬁrst
one hosting all
countries vulnerable to the global warming, suﬀering deﬁnite costs from it in
the form of physical damages,
and the second one
countries that are economically neutral with respect to the global warming,
[that] do not suﬀer from the greenhouse eﬀect (Kaitala et al. 1995, p. 69).
According to this distinction, D2(Q) = 0 for all Q, and since non-cooperative emissions of
player 2 are deﬁned as e∗2(Q) = e
m
2 for all Q, his value of the game corresponds to V
∗
2 (Q) = 0.
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6.2 The cooperative solution
In the following section we suppose that the parties do come to an arrangement under the
form of an environmental treaty, so as to cooperate in the pursuit of a shared solution for
their common pollution problem.
This time, I1 and I2 want to determine their respective emission levels ei(t) in the ﬁnite
time [0, T ], in a way that once again minimises the cost associated to the chosen level. As
in the previous case, the evolution of Q(t) is represented by (6.1).
In order to determine the cooperative solutions, starting from the two objective functions,
we obtain the following minimisation problem
Min α
ˆ T
0
e−ρt[C1(e1(t)) +D1(Q(t))] dt+ (1− α)
ˆ T
0
e−ρt[C2(e2(t)) +D2(Q(t))] dt (6.17)
subject to
∂Q
∂t
= σ(e1(t) + e2(t))− βQ(t) (6.18)
Q(0) = 0 (6.19)
with α ∈ (0, 1) showing the diﬀerent roles attributed by the regulator to the two players in
evaluating their reduction of GHG emission levels.
It is useful to remind from Subsection 6.1 that the treaty we are analysing, as all the
ones drafted in the last years, consistently diﬀerentiate between developed and developing
countries, requiring a much greater eﬀort to the ﬁrst ones. The regulator may decide to
multiply each of the objective functions for a weight wi, so as to obtain a form of discount
for player i's cost function. The idea is that through this process developing nations can
be identiﬁed as responsible for just a portion of their whole emissions; the sum discounted
corresponds to some kind of inevitable cost for the environment, a price to be paid in order
to assure them the development that they legitimately require. Therefore, coeﬃcient α may
be seen as the result of the following
α =
w1
w1 + w2
The more wi gets closer to value 1, the more the environmental damages caused by player i
are fully accounted; on the other hand, when wi 7→ 0 player i's emission costs tend to zero
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as well.
Note that (6.18) and (6.19) equal the conditions of the previous case (6.3) and (6.4).
The two participants in this cooperative game try to ﬁnd the respective functions e1α
and e2α that minimise the objective function. We therefore name J1(α) and J2(α) the values
of the functionals corresponding to I1 and I2 when the emission levels are equal to e1α and
e2α. The problem must be solved for every α, supposing that the two cost functions are both
quadratic
Ci(eiα(t)) =
1
2
ci(eiα((t)− emi )2 (6.20)
Di(Qα(t)) = di[Qα(t)]
2 (6.21)
where ci and di (i = 1, 2) are two positive parameters representing the eﬀects associated to
emission levels and to the atmospheric concentration of CO2. They are diﬀerent for each of
the two players, since our assumption was that they were not involved in the same way in the
global warming issue. The constants emi for i = 1, 2 represent the diﬀerent emission quotas
associated with each party. We presume that they were the result of the common agreement
from which the cooperative game originated.
The Hamiltonian function of the problem is the following one
H(e1α, e2α, λα, Qα) = e
−ρt[
α
2
[c1(e1α − em1 )2 + d1Q2α] +
1− α
2
[c2(e2α − em2 )2 + (6.22)
+d2Q
2
α]] + λα[σ(e1α + e2α)− βQα]
Four variables are then introduced: e1α and e2α are the control variables, while Qα(t) repre-
sents the state variable. From Chapter 5, we recall that the necessary conditions in order to
constitute the Maximum Principle require the introduction of a dummy variable, similar to
a Lagrange multiplier. It is also known as costate variable, and it is indicated through λα(t).
The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for (6.22) are represented below
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∂λα
∂t
= −[e−ρt(αd1Qα(t) + (1− α)d2Qα(t))− βλα(t)] (6.23)
∂H
∂e1α
= 0 (6.24)
∂H
∂e2α
= 0 (6.25)
∂Qα
∂t
= σ(e1α(t) + (e2α(t))− βQα(t) (6.26)
Qα(0) = 0 (6.27)
λα(T ) = 0 (6.28)
From above it can be inferred that the solutions of the problem we are analysing are
e1α(t) = e
m
1 −
σ
αc1
λα(t)e
ρt (6.29)
e2α(t) = e
m
2 −
σ
(1− α)c2λα(t)e
ρt (6.30)
Therefore, the functions determining the evolution of the state variable Qα(t) and the costate
variable λα(t) must be solutions to the system constituted by the following two linear diﬀer-
ential equations
∂λα
∂t
= −e−ρt(αd1Qα(t) + (1− α)d2Qα(t)) + βλα(t) (6.31)
∂Qα
∂t
= σ(em1 + e
m
2 )− σ2eρtλα(t)
(
1
αc1
+
1
(1− α)c2
)
− βQα(t) (6.32)
If we set Zα(t) = e
ρtλα(t), the previous system may be transformed into one with constant
coeﬃcients in the variables Zα, Qα, to whom is associated the following matrix
A(α) =
(
β + ρ −(αd1 + (1− α)d2)
−σ2
(
1
αc1
+ 1
(1−α)c2
)
−β
)
(6.33)
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In order to determine the singular values of the matrix A(α) we must ﬁrst brieﬂy intro-
duce the singular value decomposition, based on the following theorem:
Theorem 6.1 Let A ∈ Rmxn, therefore a matrix U ∈ O(m) and a matrix V ∈ O(n)
exist such that
UTAV = Σ, i.e. A = UΣV T
where the diagonal element Σ ∈ Rmxn has the following elements
σij = 0 if i 6= j
σij = σi if i = j
with
σ1 ≥ σ2 ≥ ... ≥ σr > σr+1 = ... = σp = 0, p = min{m, n}
Columns u1, ... , um of U are called left-singular vectors of A; they are eigenvectors of AA
T .
Columns v1, ... , vn are called right-singular vectors of A; they are eigenvectors of A
TA. Real
numbers σ1, ... , σp are known as singular values of A. They correspond to the square roots
of the eigenvalues λj of A
TA
σj =
√
λj(AAT ) =
√
λj(ATA)
The singular values are univocally determined.
Therefore, the singular values of the matrix A(α) are given by the expression
Vi(α) =
1
2
(ρ±
√
ρ2 + 4σ2
(
1
αc1
+
1
(1− α)c2
)
(αd1 + (1− α)d2) + 4(β + ρ)β) (6.34)
By solving it, we obtain two diﬀerent values: a positive and a negative one. Hence, we can
establish that the existing point of equilibrium -represented by (Z∗α, Q
∗
α)- is a saddle point:
in other words, here the matrix is undeﬁned.
Let vi(α) be the singular vector associated to the eigenvalue Vi(α), such that
vi(α) =
(
αd1 + (1− α)d2
β + ρ− Vi(α)
)
= (v1i(α), v2i(α)) (6.35)
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The general solution to the system requires, among other things, the determination of Z∗α
and Q∗α. Recalling our previous considerations about (6.32) and (6.33), we know that
Z∗α =
(αd1 + (1− α)d2)Q∗α
β + ρ
(6.36)
Q∗α =
(
σ(em1 + e
m
2 )− σ2
(
1
αc1
+
1
(1− α)c2
)
Z∗α
)
/β (6.37)
Once set A = (αd1 + (1 − α)d2) and B =
(
1
αc1
+ 1
(1−α)c2
)
we can determine the solution to
(6.36) and (6.37)
Z∗α =
Aσ(em1 + e
m
2 )
β(β + ρ) + ABσ2
(6.38)
Q∗α =
(
σ(em1 + e
m
2 )− σ2B
Aσ(em1 + e
m
2 )
β(β + ρ) + ABσ2
)
/β (6.39)
Once we have established Z∗α, Q
∗
α, the singular values, the singular vectors and the equilib-
rium, we ﬁnd the general solution to the system
Zα(t) = Z
∗
α +K1(α)v11(α)e
V1(α)t +K2(α)v12(α)e
V2(α)t (6.40)
Qα(t) = Q
∗
α +K1(α)v21(α)e
V1(α)t +K2(α)v22(α)e
V2(α)t (6.41)
We can determine the values associated to the constants K1(α) and K2(α) by recalling that
Qα(0) = 0 and that λα(T ) = 0 = Zα(T ). Therefore
K1(α) =
Z∗α −Q∗αv12(α)eV2(α)T
v12(α)eV2(α)T − v11(α)eV1(α)T (6.42)
K2(α) =
Q∗αv11(α)e
V1(α)T − Z∗α
v12(α)eV2(α)T − v11(α)eV1(α)T (6.43)
Once we have determinated the state and costate functions, we can proceed with the corre-
sponding functionals
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e1α(t)− em1 =
σ
αc1
λα(t)e
ρt =
σ
αc1
Zα(t) (6.44)
e2α(t)− em2 =
σ
(1− α)c2λα(t)e
ρt =
σ
(1− α)c2Zα(t) (6.45)
Finally, we can deduce that
J1(α) =
1
2
ˆ T
0
e−ρt
[
σ2
α2c21
(Zα(t))
2 + d1 (Qα(t))
2
]
dt (6.46)
J2(α) =
1
2
ˆ T
0
e−ρt
[
σ2
(1− α)2c22
(Zα(t))
2 + d2 (Qα(t))
2
]
dt (6.47)
Points (J1(α), J2(α)) with α ∈ [0, 1] are the ones that constitute the eﬃcient frontier.
6.3 Determining α: a regulator's choice
From the very introduction of the cooperative solution we have underlined how important
the role played by coeﬃcient α is. The discounting measures for the environmental costs of
each of the two coalitions of countries are associated to the values that it can assume. All the
international environmental treaties, from Rio de Janeiro (1992) to Paris (2015), recognise as
consistent the eﬀorts required from the already developed countries, while often developing
and least developed economies are request to contribute on the basis of their limited possi-
bility, or not to contribute at all. In both cases, there are no mandatory prescriptions for
them, according to the idea that while Annex II Parties have already earned their richness
(at the environment's expenses), to limitate the chances for the other nations to achieve an
equal level of development would not be fair. As a matter of fact, it was never considered as
an option by the UNFCCC. On the contrary, wealthier states are obliged to perform in two
diﬀerent ways: they should ﬁrst reduce their own emission levels, and then provide to the
rest of the world the means in order to reach a sustainable economic development.
So, when it is the regulator's duty to determine the level of discount for block I1 and the
correspondent one for block I2, a choice must be made by using the values included in the
range [0, 1]. We start by observing the ﬁnal extrem; when
lim
α→1
J1(α) = 0 (6.48)
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the second block experiences
lim
α→1
J2(α) = +∞ (6.49)
This means that if the regulator chooses to punish I1 (with respect to I2) by making him
fully responsible for his emissions, the only choice for the player is to completely stop his
production processes responsible for GHG pollution. On the contrary, since from α = 1 all
the countries reunited under I2 experience (α− 1) = 0, and the second player will be able to
maximise his own production. As a matter of fact, it must be reminded that when J1 = 0
the proﬁts associated with those countries' productions are equal to zero as well (pi1 = 0).
This implies (and was however predictable) that a possible cost decrease for I1 can be
only achieved at the expenses of I2, that would see his costs rising.
We have a similar situation to the one previously described for α 7→ 0, since
lim
α→0
J1(α) = +∞ (6.50)
and
lim
α→0
J2(α) = 0 (6.51)
This time, countries belonging to the ﬁrst block are the ones pardoned by the regulator.
6.4 Countries with diﬀerent bargaining powers
With respect to what we have previously observed, it should be remarked that international
environmental treaties are not drafted by some sort of independent, sovranational committee.
In Chapter 4 we have largely mentioned the voluntary nature of such agreements, as well as
the fact that COPs ﬁnd their origin in the UNFCCC, a convention signed by 196 countries.
Therefore, at a global level we lack the presence of a truly stand-alone regulator, and it is
more likely that nations themselves negotiate to reach a commonly agreed-upon solution.
Considering this, this section deals with the diﬀerent bargaining powers associated to each
of the block of states. Once again we shall consider two players, for the sake of simplicity.
Section 6.2 ended with the identiﬁcation of two points, J1(α) and J2(α), that consti-
tute the eﬃcient frontier. We now describe in general how bargaining powers associated with
players can determine the solution to the problem, by considering four diﬀerent approaches.
The starting point of our analysis is the deﬁnition of a negotiation problem: we consider
CHAPTER 6. A MODEL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES 98
(X, n), with X ⊆ R2 representing the set of achievable agreements and with n being a point
of X known as the disagreement point. It depicts what would happen if a scenario in which
the players were not able to ﬁnd a common solution took place.
Supposing that the axiom of rational behavior holds, players want to maximise their ex-
pected beneﬁts. Additionaly, we suppose that set X is closed and convex. Knowing that
a rational player will not accept an agreement whose associated beneﬁts are lower than the
ones resulting from the situation represented by the disagreement point, we can consider only
the scenarios where x ≥ n. They are represented by set F .
The ﬁrst methodology explained could not have been but Nash's (1950), which stated
that there exist a unique solution, provided that certain axioms are satisﬁed:
1. symmetry -meaning that the players have the same bargaining power;
2. strong eﬃciency -implying that the solution belongs to the eﬃcient frontier;
3. individual rationality -since no player will accept an outcome worse than the one
associated with a failure in the agreement;
4. scale covariance -stating that the outcome for the parties is independent of the way
utility is measured;
5. independence of irrelevant alternatives -which signiﬁes that a reasonable outcome
that is still achievable after some allocations are removed remains a reasonable outcome.
Or, in other terms, let G be the bargaining game with payoﬀ space X and disagreement
point n, and let x¯ be the solution of the game. If we denote by G∗ the game obtained
from G by restricting X to Q ⊂ X such that n ∈ Q and x¯ ∈ Q, then x¯ is also the
solution of G∗.
From this work, the following methods were developed:
 Harsanyi and Selten (1972) criticised Nash for the use of symmetry, the ﬁrst one
of the axioms leading to a Nash solution on our list. They introduced the less strong
asymmetric Nash solution, which permits to consider diﬀerent levels of bargaining power
associated to the players of the game, and therefore is more adherent to the empirical
evidence.
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 Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) on the contrary concentrated on the last axiom,
independence of irrelevant alternatives, substituting it with a monotonicity condition.
According to it, with (U, u) being a general Nash bargaining problem andB the set of all
bargaining problems, a bargaining solution x¯ ∈ (Rn)B is monotone if and only if for all
(U, u), (U
′
, u
′
) ∈ B such that u = u′ , U ⊂ U ′ and for some i = 1, ... , n maxpii(U) =
maxpii(U
′
), it holds that for all j 6= i
xj(U, u) ≤ xj(U ′ , u′)
A few years later, Anbarci (1993) was responsible for the introduction of the related
area monotonic solution.
 Finally, Chung (1988) was responsible for the equal-loss solution, whose aim is to seek
some sort of equality in bargaining situations. Parties equalise their respective losses
with regards to the best case scenario, represented by an ideal point Id placed out of
the eﬃcient frontier.
We now suppose to have a parametric representation of the eﬃcient frontier, where the
functions that are responsible for such parametrisation are strictly monotonic and continuous.
Hence, let (x1(t), x2(t)) be a parametrisation of the eﬃcient frontier, with t ∈ I and I
being an interval of R. Recalling that n represents the disagreement point, the achievable
agreements' area is circumscribed by the coordinates of such point; this situation is depicted
in Graph 6.1.
Graph 6.1: Representation of the achievable agreements
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If we look at the eﬃcient frontier, the set of solutions is restricted to the curve's points
included between A and B. Set F is represented in Graph 6.1 as well.
Points A and B can be obtained through two values t1, t2 such that A = (x1(t1), n2) and
B = (n1, x2(t2)). The continuity and the monotonicity of the parametrisation guarantee the
existence of these values.
Let us suppose that we are dealing with a scenario where t1 < t2 and let J = [t1, t2]. The
Nash bargaining solution is represented by the only point belonging to the Pareto frontier
which maximises the Nash product -(x1 − n1)(x2 − n2)- which is the diﬀerence between
achievable agreements and the value associated with the disagreement.
Therefore, the Nash solution is the solution to the following problem
max
x∈F
(x1 − n1)(x2 − n2) (6.52)
If a diﬀerent bargaining power is associated to the players (represented by b1, b2 ∈ R, with
b1 + b2 = 1) we can consider the generalised Nash solution xN (Harsanyi e Selten 1972),
that is the point solving the following problem
max
x∈F
(x1 − n1)b1(x2 − n2)b2 (6.53)
In other words, the previous solution (6.52) is a particular case of the one (6.53) that we
have just found, and it occurs only when b1 = b2, that is when the bargaining powers are
identical.
Since we have considered the eﬃcient frontier through a parametric form, the problem
that we have to solve can be set like the following one, concerning the maximisation of a
variable
max
t∈J
(x1(t)− n1)b1(x2(t)− n2)b2 (6.54)
According to Nash, point n becomes the reference with respect to which the solution has
to be calculated. On the contrary, according to Kalai e Smorodinsky (1975, p. 513-
518), we have to take into account two points, the disagreement point n and the ideal point
Id = (Id1, Id2). The latter is out of reach for both players, but represents the maximum
beneﬁts which they can desire. We can ﬁnd this solution by looking at the point belonging to
the eﬃcient frontier and also located on the straight line that unites the disagreement point
to the ideal one. It is the same that satisﬁes the following equation
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x2 − n2 = n2 − Id2
n1 − Id1 (x1 − d1) (6.55)
If the bargaining powers belonging to each party are not the same, we can determine the
generalised Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, and therefore consider the solution resulting from
the intersection of the eﬃcient frontier with the straight line
x2 − n2 = b2
b1
(x1 − n1) (6.56)
Diﬀerently from what we have previously observed, the new solution does not coincide with
the generalised Nash one for the case b1 = b2. Such a coincidence only exists when the slope
of the straight line uniting the ideal point Id to the disagreement point n equals 1.
We consider exactly this case.
Recalling the parametric representation of the frontier, we are seeking the value of t ∈ J
such that
x2(t)− n2 = b2
b1
(x1(t)− n1) (6.57)
Graph 6.2: Area monotonic solution
Solution x¯m = (xm1, xm2) represents the only point belonging to the eﬃcient frontier
such that the closed line segment which is bounded by n and x¯m divides F in two equal
parts, A1 e A2 (Graph 6.2). When we have two diﬀerent bargaining powers (and therefore
an asymmetric conﬂict), we consider the solution thanks to which the relation between the
two areas is b1
b2
, that is A1w1 = A2w2. Once again, this case coincides with the generalised
solution when the bargaining powers are equal, and b1
b2
= 1.
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Let S1 be the area limited by the eﬃcient frontier between xm and A = (x1(t1), n2), axis
x and the straight lines x1 = xm1 and x1 = x1(t1). We will have that
A1 =
1
2
(xm2 − n2)(xm1 − n1) + S1 − n2(x1(t1)− xm1) (6.58)
Again, let S2 be the area limited by the eﬃcient frontier between B = (n1, x2(t2)) and xm,
axis x and the straight lines x1 = n1 and x1 = xm1. In this case
A2 = S2 − xm2 + n2
2
(xm1 − n1) (6.59)
Finally, we analyse the equal-loss solution (Chung 1988), which aims to determine the point
belonging to the eﬃcient frontier where the two players experience the same loss in beneﬁts,
with regards to their respective ideal scenario (Idi, i = 1, 2). Following the same line of
thoughts we have previously expressed, we may consider diﬀerent bargaining powers for the
parties, and deduce that the relation between such powers is reﬂected in the one between
their losses. The equal-loss solution is the point belonging to the eﬃcient frontier such that
(x1 − Id1)b1 = (x2 − Id2)b2 (6.60)
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